During the summer I indulged in war tales reading. Most of the people find those rather boring but not for me. I came across some recalling the battles which took place during the Falklands War, in 1982.
The whole story caught my interest. Thanks to History Channel and the always good Wiki here you get a summary. Enjoy!
Falklands War
The Falklands War also called the Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the disputed Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, and their name and ownership have long been disputed. (See Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for the background to the latter dispute.)
The war was triggered by the occupation of South Georgia by Argentina on 19 March 1982 followed by the occupation of the Falklands, and ended with Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982. War was not actually declared by either side. The initial invasion was considered by Argentina as the re-occupation of its own territory, and by Britain as an invasion of a British overseas territory, and the most recent invasion of British territory by a foreign power.
In the period leading up to the war, Argentina was in the midst of a devastating economic crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the repressive military junta that had been governing the country since 1976. The Argentine military government, headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri, sought to maintain power by diverting public attention playing off long-standing feelings of the Argentines towards the islands,although they never thought that the United Kingdom would respond militarily.The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased on 19 March when a group of hired Argentinian scrap metal merchants raised their flag at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Argentine Military Junta, suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces,ordered the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April, triggering the Falklands War.
Word of the invasion first reached Britain via ham radio.Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, but launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious assault. After combat resulting in 258 British and 649 Argentine deaths, the British eventually prevailed and the islands remained under British control. However, as of 2007 and as it has since 19th century, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim (the claim is included in the National Constitution).
The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through both: the Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom, the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was bolstered. It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the 1983 general election, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, films, and songs. However, it is not seen as a truly major event of either military or 20th century history because of the low number of casualties on both sides and the small size and limited economic importance of the disputed areas. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion.
Background to the Falklands War
The Falklands/Malvinas consist of two main and many smaller islands in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina. Ownership of the group had long been disputed. The Falklands were probably first discovered in the 1520s by the Spanish. The first British claim dates from 1592. In 1690, the British named them after the Treasurer of the Navy, Viscount Falkland. On 5 April 1764, France established a settlement on East Falkland and claimed the islands, which the Spanish offered to buy as they were concerned about disrupting the balance of power in the region. In 1765, the British established a settlement on Saunders Island, and in 1767 France transferred its settlement to Spain. In 1770, the Spanish captured the British settlement, but in 1771 it was handed back. In 1774 and 1806-11, respectively, the British and Spanish left the islands, each maintaining a claim over them. It is in this general period that the confusion lies.
Argentina gained independence from Spain in 1816 and thus control over the Falklands (Islas Malvinas). In 1829, Argentina established Luis Maria Vernet as the first governor of the islands. Finally, in 1833 the British occupied the islands by force and ejected its inhabitants to the Argentine mainland. (For more details on the origin of the dispute see History of the Falkland Islands.)
With the late 20th century absorption of the British Colonial Office into the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, successive British governments had come to see the dispute with Argentina as a minor problem from which they would have been happy to relieve themselves. Despite their government's neglect, the 1,800 or so inhabitants of British origin steadfastly refused to become part of Argentina, citing Article 73 of the United Nations charter to support their position. In 1965, under UN Resolution 2065, Britain and Argentina started negotiations on the islands' future, but seventeen years later little had changed. While the idea of a 'leaseback' of the islands was proposed, under which Britain would cede sovereignty to Argentina after fifty years, nothing materialised.
Argentina was going through a devastating economic crisis. There was also massive social unrest against the Military Junta which had murdered thousands of Argentines for political opposition to the unelected Junta. Between 1976 and 1983—under military rule—in the middle of the "Dirty War", supposedly waged against communism, thousands of people, most of them dissidents and innocent civilians unconnected with terrorism, were arrested and then vanished without trace. Many of these people simply 'disappeared'. Death squads struck with impunity, terrorizing working class union members and anyone opposed to the corruption which infested the country's higher ranks.
The oppression of the Argentine people continued under a succession of dictators from General Jorge Videla to General Roberto Viola and then General Leopoldo Galtieri for a short while. Before he started the Falklands War, Galtieri was subject to growing opposition from the people. The actual dictatorship of General Galtieri lasted only eighteen months but he was a key player in the slaughter and oppression of his own people for years previous. Throughout 1981, Argentina saw inflation climb to over 600%, GDP went down 11.4%, manufacturing output down 22.9% and real wages by 19.2%. The Unions were gaining more support for a general strike every day and the popular opposition to the Junta was growing rapidly.
Critics of the invasion by Argentina claim that the Junta sought to use the patriotism of war to quell unrest in the working classes, hoping that whilst engulfed in a patriotic fervour, the Argentines would forget about the crisis, and the crimes of their military. Likewise, critics of the British government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher claim that she sought to use the war to bolster her flagging popularity—another "splendid little war." The Royal Navy maintained a military presence in the area in the form of a small group of forty Royal Marines known as Naval Party 8901, and HMS Endurance, an aging patrol vessel which was on the verge of decommissioning.
Lead-up to the conflict
President Galtieri, head of the National Reorganization Process (the military government of Argentina at the time) aimed to counterbalance public concern over economic and human rights issues with a speedy victory over the Falklands which would appeal to popular nationalistic sentiment. Argentine intelligence officers had been working with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help fund the Contras in Nicaragua, and the Argentine government believed it might be rewarded for this activity by non-interference on the part of the United States if it invaded the Falklands.
Argentina exerted pressure in the United Nations by raising subtle hints of a possible invasion, but the British either missed or ignored this threat and did not react. The Argentines assumed that the British would not use force if the islands were invaded.
According British sources, the Argentines interpreted the lack of British reaction as disinterest in the Falklands due the planned withdrawal as part of a general reduction in size of the Royal Navy in 1981 of the last of the Antarctic Supply vessels, HMS Endurance, and by the British Nationality Act of 1981, which replaced the full British citizenship of Falkland Islanders with a more limited version.
In Operation Sol in 1976, a landing of 50 Argentines on the unoccupied Southern Thule, belonging to the British South Sandwich Islands, was commanded by Captain César Trombetta. The established scientific station Corbeta Uruguay, only led to a formal protest from United Kingdom. Operation Journeyman, the despatching of a small military force to the South Atlantic by Callaghan's Labour government, may have helped avert further action and subsequent reports from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in 1977, 1979 and 1981 suggested that "as long as [Argentina] calculated that the British Government were prepared to negotiate seriously on sovereignty, it was unlikely to resort to force." However, if "...negotiations broke down, or if Argentina concluded from them that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action
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They drew their plans
At a lunch between Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya and General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri on 9 December 1981, in the main army barracks of Campo de Mayo, it was discussed how and when to overthrow President Viola. Anaya offered the navy's support on the understanding that the navy would be allowed to occupy the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Galtieri appears to have hoped for the public opinion to reward a successful occupation with him in power for at least ten years. They believed that Argentina's flag flying in Port Stanley on the 150th anniversary of Britain's illegal usurpation of Las Malvinas, would led to an neo-Perónist era of national pride. The Air Force's Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo wasn't informed of the decision before 29 December.
The detailed planning began in early January 1982. It was headed by Rear-Admiral Juan José Lombardo (Commander-in-Chief Fleet) and included General Osvald Garcia (commander of the Fifth Army Corps) and Brigadier Sigfrido Plessel (member of the Air Force Staff). The operation would be an amphibious landing en masse of 3,000 troops, to minimise the bloodshed. The contingent of Royal Marines, the British civil servicemen and the more anti-Argentine among the Kelpers should be deported and the bulk of the invasion force should return to their bases within 48 hours. A military governor and about 500 military police soldiers should be left to keep the Kelpers in line. Anaya's draft planned to replace the entire island population with Argentine settlers (similar to 1833), but Lombardo believed that such a step would outrage the international community. Instead Kelpers should be offered a financial compensation, if they wished to emigrate.
Argentina had build the runway in Port Stanley and the military Líneas Aéreas del Estado airline flew regular to the Falkland Islands. LADE was represented by Vice-Commodore Hector Gilobert in Port Stanley and he had been gathering intelligence for four years. The cargo ship ARA Isla de los Estados was hired for commercial purposes by the island administration and her captain Capaglio had detailed information regarding the Falkland coast, beaches and inner waters. In an atmosphere of arms selling, United Kingdom was very transparent to the Argentine naval attaché in London, Rear-Admiral Walter Allara. He was invited on board HMS Invincible and had conversations with British naval personnel, regarding the shortcomings of Royal Navy.
In January 1982, these diplomatic talks over sovereignty ceased. Although it is often thought that the Falklands invasion was a long-planned action, it became clear after the war that the following defence had been largely improvised; for example, sea mines were not deployed at strategic landing locations and a large part of the infantry forces sent to the Falklands consisted of the current intake of conscripts, who had only begun their training in the Jan/Feb of that year. Arguments that the War was a last minute decision are bolstered by the fact that the Argentine Navy would have received, at the end of the year, additional French Exocet anti-ship missiles, Super Étendards (French fighter aircraft capable of firing the Exocet) and new ships being built in West Germany.
The Argentine Navy possessed modern British-built Type 42 air-defence destroyers of the type forming the bulk of the British Task Force's anti-air umbrella. The air force had realised, in training attacks made after the landings that they could lose over half of their units in the process of destroying only a few British warships if they attacked at the medium to high altitudes. Sea Dart was designed to engage. Hence, during the war, they surprised many observers, with losses far below that expected given their level of preparedness. Much of this was due to the low-level stand-off employment of Exocet over blue-water, and over-land approaches when in the littoral.
This lack of readiness is probably due to the invasion being a last-minute decision taken as a consequence of the South Georgia crisis. Furthermore, for several years, Argentina had been on the brink of war with Chile. Consequently, a significant part of Argentina's limited forces and equipment were kept on the mainland, as Argentina's military strategists feared that Chile would take advantage of the Falklands Crisis and attempt to seize a portion of the Patagonia region. As a consequence, Chile deployed forces along border regions in what looked like a possible invasion; it is unclear whether this was their true intention or merely a diversion prompted by their British allies.
Argentina's original intention was to mount a quick symbolic occupation, quickly followed by a withdrawal, leaving only a small garrison to support the new military governor. This was based on the Argentinian assumption that the British would never respond militarily. All Argentine assault units were withdrawn to the mainland in the following days, but strong popular support and the rapid British reaction forced the Junta to change their objectives and reinforce the islands, since they could not politically afford to lose the islands and the British looked like they were going to fight. They misjudged the political climate in Britain, believing that democracies were weak, indecisive and averse to risk and did not anticipate that the British would move their fleet halfway across the globe.
Landings on South Georgia
In 1980 Admiral Edgardo Otero (former notorious commander of the Naval Mechanical School, where hundreds of disappeared were tortured and executed) was head of the navy's Antarctic operations and he wanted to repeat Operation Sol in South Georgia called Operation Alpha. Admiral Lombardo feared that an early Operation Alpha would jeopardise the secret preparations for the Falkland landings, but Admiral Otero had close links to Admiral Anaya. The Argentine entrepreneur Constantino Davidoff had a two-year old contract regarding scrapping an old whaling station on South Georgia. He was transported with the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irizar, headed by Captain Trombetta, to South Georgia for an initial survey of the work. This led to a diplomatic protest. Later, on March 19, a group of Argentinian scrap metal workers established a camp at Leith Harbour, South Georgia, where they raised the Argentinian flag. They arrived with the naval transport ARA Bahía Buen Suceso and the workers were infiltrated with Buzo Tacticos (special forces) led by Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz (the blond angel of death). The British administrator at Grytviken asked them to have their passports stamped, which they refused to do since it would acknowledge British sovereignty over the isles.
The Royal Navy Antarctic patrol vessel HMS Endurance was dispatched to remove the camp on 25 March, but was prevented from doing so and forced to retreat by the Argentine Navy Corvette ARA Guerrico. Later, despite evidence that the Argentine Navy had begun to assemble troops in Puerto Belgrano, UK Joint Intelligence Committee's Latin American group stated on March 30 that "invasion was not imminent."
Failed diplomacy
During the conflict, there were no formal diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina, so negotiations were carried out in a rather indirect way, and via third parties who spoke with one then with the other belligerent ("shuttle diplomacy"). The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, announced that his efforts in favour of peace were futile. Although Peru (which represented Argentina's diplomatic interests in Britain) and Switzerland (which represented Britain's diplomatic interests in Argentina) exerted great diplomatic pressure to avoid war, they were unable to resolve the conflict, and a peace plan proposed by Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry was rejected by both sides
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Invasion
The British Government warned Rex Masterman Hunt, the Governor of the Falkland Islands, of a possible Argentine invasion on 31 March. Hunt then organized a defence, and gave military command to Major Mike Norman RM, who managed to muster a small force of Royal Marines. The Argentine Lieutenant-Commander in charge of the invasion, Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots, landed his special forces at Mullet Creek. He proceeded to attack the buildings in and around Stanley, including Government House and the Moody Brook Barracks until the Falkland Islands government at Government House surrendered on April 4. One British Royal Marine was wounded, and one Argentine killed in the main invasion; a further three Argentines were killed in fighting to take control of South Georgia.
Life under the occupationArgentina made Spanish the official language of the Islands and changed Port Stanley's name to Puerto Argentino. Traffic was commanded to drive on the right by painting arrows on the road indicating the direction of traffic and changing the location of street and traffic signs. However, outside Stanley, most roads were single track anyway.
Argentinian Captain Barry Melbourne Hussey, who was chosen for a position in the administration due to his knowledge and experience of English, asserted safety as a major concern, during discussions with the Islanders; "Which would you prefer, that our eighteen-year-old conscripts, with their big lorries, should try to drive on the left, or that you, with your little vehicles, change to the right?"
No confiscation of private property occurred during the occupation (all goods obtained from the islanders were paid for), but had the islanders refused to sell, the goods in question would have been taken anyway, as is normal in military situations.
There was no widespread abuse of the population; indeed after the war it was found that even the Islanders' personal food supplies and stocks of alcohol were untouched, and Brigadier-General Menéndez, the Argentine governor of the Islands, had made it clear from the start that he would not engage in any combat in Stanley itself.
Task force
The British were quick to organise diplomatic pressure against Argentina. Because of the long distance to the Falklands, Britain had to rely on a naval task force for military action. The overall naval force was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who was designated Commander Task Force 317, and had three to four subordinate task groups, depending on the stage of the war. Rear Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward’s Task Group 317.8 was centered around the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and the newly-commissioned HMS Invincible carrying only 20 Fleet Air Arm (FAA) Sea Harriers between them for defence against the combined Argentinian air force and naval air arm. The task force would have to be self-reliant and able to project its force across the littoral area of the Islands.
A second component was the Amphibious Group, Task Group 317.0, commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp RN. The embarked force, the Landing Group or Task Group 317.1, comprised 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, (including units attached from the British Army’s Parachute Regiment and a number of units under the Royal Armoured Corps cap badge (The Blues & Royals)) under the command of Brigadier Julian Thompson, RM, to bring it up to its wartime strength. Most of this force was aboard the hastily-commandeered cruise liner Canberra.
A third was Submarine Group (TG 324.3?) of three to four submarines under Flag Officer Submarines. The UK declared a 'total exclusion zone' of 200 nautical miles (370km) around the Falklands before commencing operation, excluding all nations' vessels.
Throughout the operation, 43 British merchant ships (ships taken up from trade, or STUFT) served with or supplied the task force. Cargo vessels and tankers for fuel and water formed an 8000-mile logistics chain between Britain and the South Atlantic.
During the journey and up to the War beginning on May 1, the Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force. One of these flights was intercepted outside the exclusion zone by a Sea Harrier; the unarmed 707 was not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the British had not yet decided to commit themselves to war.
Prince Andrew, then second in line to the British throne, served as a Sea King helicopter pilot for No.820 Naval Air Squadron on HMS Invincible during the war, flying antisubmarine and anti-surface patrols. His helicopter also acted as an improvised airborne early warning platform, helped in casualty evacuation, transport and search and rescue.
The British called their counter-invasion Operation Corporate. When the task force sailed from Britain, the American news magazine Newsweek cover headline proclaimed “The Empire Strikes Back,” the name of a recent Star Wars film, in humorous reference to the old British Empire.
Public Opinion
The public mood in the UK was in support of an attempt to reclaim the islands. International opinion was divided. To some, Britain was a former colonial power, seeking to reclaim a colony from a local power, and this was a message that the Argentines initially used to garner support. Others supported Britain as a stable democracy invaded by a military dictatorship. Whilst remaining diplomatically neutral, most European countries and the United States supported Britain; many Latin American countries supported Argentina (with the notable exception of Chile, due to the territorial conflicts with Argentina which had led to a difficult diplomatic relationship, combined with some speeches from Junta members hinting that Argentina would take military action to resolve those territorial issues once the Falkland Islands were properly controlled).
British diplomacy centred on arguing that the Falkland Islanders were entitled to use the UN principle of self-determination and showing willingness to compromise. The UN Secretary-General said that he was amazed at the compromise that the UK had offered. Nevertheless, Argentina rejected it, the Junta being constrained by massive popular support for the invasion and unable to backtrack; they based their arguments on rights to territory based on actions before both 1945 and the creation of the UN. Many UN members realised that if territorial claims this old could be resurrected, and invasions of territory allowed unchallenged, then their own borders were not safe. On April 3, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 502, calling for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the islands and the cessation of hostilities. On April 10, the European Community approved trade sanctions against Argentina. President Ronald Reagan and the United States’ administration did not issue direct diplomatic condemnations, instead providing intelligence support to the British military.
Shuttle diplomacy and U.S. involvementAt first glance, it appeared that the U.S. had military treaty obligations to both parties in the war, bound to the UK as a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to Argentina by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the "Rio Pact"). However, the North Atlantic Treaty only obliges the signatories to support if the attack occurs in Europe or North America north of Tropic of Cancer, and the Rio Pact only obliges the U.S. to intervene if one of the adherents to the treaty is attacked—the UK never attacked Argentina, only Argentine forces on British territory. In March, Secretary of State Alexander Haig directed the United States Ambassador to Argentina to warn the Argentine government away from any invasion. President Reagan requested assurances from Galtieri against an invasion and offered the services of his Vice President, George H.W. Bush, as mediator, but was refused.
In fact, the Reagan Administration was sharply divided on the issue. Meeting on April 5, Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger favoured backing Britain, concerned that equivocation would undermine the NATO alliance. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders, however, feared that supporting Britain would undermine U.S. anti-communist efforts in Latin America. He received the firm backing of U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Haig's nominal subordinate and political rival. Kirkpatrick was guest of honour at a dinner held by the Argentine ambassador to the United States, on the day that the Argentine armed forces landed on the islands.
The White House continued its neutrality; Reagan famously declared at the time that he could not understand why two allies were arguing over "that little ice-cold bunch of land down there". But he assented to Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's position. Haig briefly (April 8–April 30) headed a "shuttle diplomacy" mission between London and Buenos Aires. According to a recent BBC documentary titled: "The Falklands War and the White House" (
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/documentary_archive/6591267.stm),
Caspar Weinberger's Department of Defense began a number of non-public actions to support and supply the British military while Haig's shuttle diplomacy was still ongoing. Haig's message to the Argentines was that the British would indeed fight, and that the U.S. would support Britain, but at the time he was not aware that the U.S. was providing substantial support already.
At the end of the month Reagan blamed Argentina for the failure of the mediation, declared U.S. support for Britain, and announced the imposition of economic sanctions against Argentina.
In a notorious episode in June, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick cast a second veto of a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, then announced minutes later that she had received instructions to abstain. The situation was blamed on a delay in communications, but perceived by many as part of an ongoing power struggle between Haig and Kirkpatrick.
Galtieri, and a fair proportion of his government did not think that the UK would react. Margaret Thatcher declared that the democratic rights of the Falkland Islanders had been assaulted, and would not surrender the islands to the Argentinian "jackboot." This stance was aided, at least domestically, by the mostly supportive British press.
The Argentine dictatorship felt that the United States would, even in a worst-case scenario, remain completely neutral in the conflict (based upon the support that Argentina had given to the Reagan administration in Central America, training Contras). This assumption demonstrated a clear blindness to the reality of the US-UK special relationship.
To some extent, the Argentine military dictatorship was misled by its own opinion of democracies as being weak, inefficient talking-shops, afraid of taking risks. Indeed, in Britain there was much debate about the rights and wrongs of war. However, regardless of their own policies and opinions, opposition parties firmly backed the government during the crisis to present a single united front.
A U.S. fear of the perceived threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, along with the certainty that Britain could handle the matter on its own, may have influenced the U.S. to take a position of non-interference. During the Cold War, with the performance of forces being watched closely by the Soviet Union, it was considered preferable for the UK to handle without assistance a conflict within its capabilities.
American non-interference was vital to the American-British relationship. Ascension Island, a British possession, was vital in the long term supply of the Task Force South; however, the airbase stationed on it was run and operated by the U.S. The American commander of the base was ordered to assist the British in any way, and for a brief period Ascension Air Field was one of the busiest airports in the world. The most expedient NATO contributions were satellite photographs, intelligence information, and the rescheduled supply of the latest model of Sidewinder Lima all-aspect infra-red seeking missiles, which allowed existing British inventory to be employed. Margaret Thatcher stated that "without the Harrier jets and their immense manoeuvrability, equipped as they were with the latest version of the Sidewinder missile, supplied to us by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, we could never have got back the Falklands". This is not only politically, but militarily questionable, however, as all the Fleet Air Arm Sidewinder engagements, proved to be from the rear.
In early May, Casper Weinberger offered the use of an American aircraft carrier. This seemingly extremely generous offer was seen by some as vital: it was noted by Woodward that the loss of Invincible would have been a severe setback, but the loss of Hermes would have meant an end to the whole operation. Weinberger admits that there would have been many problems if a request had ever been made; not least, it would have meant U.S. personnel becoming directly involved in the conflict, as training British forces to crew the vessel would have taken years.
Both Weinberger and Reagan were later awarded the British honour of Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE). American critics of the U.S. role claimed that, by failing to side with Argentina, the U.S. violated its own Monroe Doctrine.
In September 2001, President of Mexico Vicente Fox cited the conflict as proof of the failure of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, since the treaty provides for mutual defence. However, in this conflict, Argentina was the aggressor.
French involvement
President of France François Mitterrand gave full support to the UK in the Falklands war. Sir John Nott, who was Secretary of State for Defence during the conflict, has acknowledged in his memoirs that "In so many ways Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies". A large part of Argentina's military equipment was French-made, so French support was crucial. Sir John has revealed that France provided Mirage and Etendard aircraft, identical to the ones that it supplied to Argentina, for British pilots to train against. It is also disclosed in Sir John's memoirs that France provided intelligence to help fight the Exocet missiles that it had sold to Argentina, including details of special electronic countermeasures that at the time were only known to the French armed forces. In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher says of Mitterrand that "I never forgot the debt we owed him for his personal support...throughout the Falklands Crisis". As France had recently sold Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles to the Argentine Navy, there was still a French team in Argentina helping to fit out the Exocets and aircraft for Argentine use at the beginning of the war. Argentina claims that the team left for France soon after the April 2 invasion, but according to Dr. James Corum the French team apparently continued to assist the Argentines throughout the war, in spite of the NATO embargo and official French government policy.
Latin American support
Argentina received military assistance only from Peru — despite receiving cursory support from the Organisation of American States in a resolution supporting Argentina's sovereignty and deploring European Community sanctions (with Chile, and Colombia, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States attending but abstaining), and Venezuela. Peruvian president Belaunde announced that his country was "ready to support Argentina with all the resources it needed." This came in the form of aircraft supplies such as long range air fuel (drop) tanks and spare parts. With the War over, Argentina received Mirage 5P fighter planes from the Peruvian Air Force whilst the Argentine Navy received Aermacchi MB-326 and Embraer Bandeirantes from the Brazilian Air Force.
Cuba and Bolivia offered ground troops, but their offers were seen as political posturing and not accepted.
Neighbouring Chile, under General Pinochet's regime, became the only major Latin American country to support Britain (and then only indirectly) by providing a military and naval diversion. Chile and Argentina had almost gone to war over the possession of islands south of Tierra del Fuego during the Beagle conflict in 1978. The dispute ended peacefully with the 1984 Argentina and Chile Peace and Friendship Treaty mediated by Pope John Paul II). The relationship between these two countries was still very tense. The Chilean government was possibly concerned that if Argentina succeeded in taking the Falklands, General Galtieri's government would invade or attack Chile. The Chilean Connection is described in detail by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his book The Official History of the Falklands Campaign.
In her book "Statecraft", Lady Thatcher claims that General Pinochet gave Britain "vital" support during the war, most notably in intelligence, which saved British lives. Thatcher claims that the Chilean Air Force often provided Britain with early warning of impending Argentine Air Force attacks. When, at one point, the Chilean long-range radar was switched off for 24 hours for maintenance work, the Argentinian Air Force was able to bomb the Royal Navy ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram with many casualties.
Commonwealth support
Of the Commonwealth nations New Zealand made available the frigates HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Waikato as replacements for British ships in the Indian Ocean, freeing British vessels for deployment to the Falklands.
Events which led to warOn April 2, 1982 Argentine forces mounted amphibious landings of the Falkland Islands (Spanish: Islas Malvinas), following on from the civilian occupation of South Georgia on March 19, before the Falklands War began. This article describes the initial defence organised by the Falkland Islands' Governor Sir Rex Hunt giving command to Major Mike Norman RM, the landing of Lieutenant-Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots' Special Forces, the attack on Moody Brook Barracks, the engagement between the troops of Hugo Santillan and Bill Trollope at Stanley, and the battle and final surrender of Government House.
Defence
Governor Sir Rex Hunt was informed by the British Government of a possible Argentine invasion on Wednesday March 31. The Governor summoned the two senior Royal Marines officers of Naval Party 8901 to Government House in Stanley to discuss the options for defending the Falklands. He said during the meeting, "Sounds like the buggers mean it", remaining composed despite the seriousness of the situation that the islands faced.
Major Mike Norman RM was given overall command of the Marines due to his seniority, while Major Gary Noott RM became the military advisor to Governor Hunt. The total strength was 68 Marines and 11 sailors, which was greater than would normally have been available because the garrison was in the process of changing over. Both the replacements and the troops preparing to leave were in the Falklands at the time of the invasion. This was decreased to 57 when twenty-two Royal Marines embarked aboard the Antarctic patrol ship Endurance to observe Argentine soldiers based at South Georgia. But their numbers were reinforced by 25 Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) members. Graham Bound who lived through the Argentine occupation reports instead in his book Falkland Islanders At War that approximately 40 (both serving and past) members of the (FIDF) reported for duty at their Drill Hall. Their commanding officer, Major Phil Summers, tasked the volunteer militiamen with guarding such key points as the telephone exchange, the radio station and the power station. Skipper Jack Sollis, onboard the civilian coastal ship Forrest operated his boat as an improvised radar screen station off Stanley. Two other civilians, former Marine Jim Alister and a Canadian subject, Bill Curtiss, also offered their services to the Governor.
Operation Azul
The Argentine operation codenamed Azul (blue) began in the late evening of Thursday April 1 when the Argentine destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad halted 500 metres off Mullet Creek and lowered 21 Gemini assault craft into the water. They contained 84 special forces troopers of Lieutenant-Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots' 1st Amphibious Commandos Group and a small party under Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Giachino,who was normally 2IC of the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion, that was to capture Government House. The Argentine Rear Admiral Jorge Allara had requested that Rex Hunt surrender peacefully, but the proposal was rejected.
The operation had been called Rosario (Rosary) during the planning stage, but it was renamed Azul (blue) after the colour of the Virgin Mary's robe.
Attack on Moody Brook barracksGiachino's party had the shortest distance to go: two and a half miles due north. Moody Brook Barracks, the destination of the main party, was six miles away, over rough Falklands terrain. Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots, in the book The Argentine Fight for The Falklands, describes the main party's progress in the dark:
It was a nice night, with a moon, but the cloud covered the moon for most of the time.... It was very hard going with our heavy loads; it was hot work. We eventually became split up into three groups. We only had one night sight; the lead man, Lieutenant Arias had it. One of the groups became separated when a vehicle came along the track we had to cross. We thought it was a military patrol. Another group lost contact, and the third separation was caused by someone going too fast. This caused my second in command, Lieutenant Bardi, to fall. He suffered a hairline fracture of the ankle and had to be left behind with a man to help him. … We were at Moody Brook by 5.30 a.m., just on the limits of the time planned, but with no time for the one hour's reconnaissance for which we had hoped.
The main party of Argentine Marines assumed that the Moody Brook Barracks contained sleeping Royal Marines. The barracks were quiet, although a light was on in the office of the Royal Marine commander. No sentries were observed, and it was a quiet night, apart from the occasional animal call. Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots could hear nothing of any action at Government House, nor from the distant landing beaches; nevertheless, he ordered the assault to begin. Lieutenant-Commander Sanchez-Sabarots continues his account:
It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas to force the British out of the buildings and capture them. Our orders were not to cause casualties if possible. That was the most difficult mission of my career. All our training as commandos was to fight aggressively and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. We surrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north of Stanley Harbour. Anyone who did get away would not able to reach the town and reinforce the British there. Then we threw the gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty.
The noise of the grenades alerted Major Norman to the presence of Argentines on the island, and he thus drove back to Government House. Realising that the attack was coming from Moody Brook, he ordered all troop sections to converge on the house to enable the defence to be centralised.
Amphibious landing at Yorke Bay
There was a more pressing action on the eastern edge of Stanley. Twenty US-built LVTP-7A1 tracked amphibious armoured personnel carriers from the 1st Amphibious Vehicles Battalion, carrying D and E Companies of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion, had been landed from the tank landing ship Cabo San Antonio at Yorke Bay, and were being watched by a section of Royal Marines under the command of Lieutenant Bill Trollope. The armoured column trundled along the Airport Road into Stanley, with three Amtracs (Numbers 05, 07 and 19) in the vanguard, and, near the Ionospheric Research Station, at exactly 7:15 am, was engaged by a section of Royal Marines with anti-tank rockets and machine-guns. This from Lieutenant-Commander Hugo Santillan's official post-battle report:
We were on the last stretch of the road into Stanley... A machine-gun fired from one of the three white houses about 500 metres away and hit the right-hand Amtrac. The fire was very accurate. Then there were some explosions from a rocket launcher, but they were inaccurate, falling a long way from us. We followed our standard operating procedure and took evasive action. The Amtrac on the right returned fire and took cover in a little depression. Once he was out of danger, I told all three vehicles to disembark their men... I ordered the crew with the recoilless rifle to fire one round of hollow charge at the ridge of the roof of the house where the machine-gun was, to cause a bang but not an explosion. We were still following our orders not to inflict casualties. The first round was about a hundred metres short, but the second hit the roof. The British troops then threw a purple smoke grenade; I thought it was their signal to withdraw. They had stopped firing, so Commander Weinstabl started the movement of the two companies around the position. Some riflemen in one of the houses started firing then; that was quite uncomfortable. I couldn't pinpoint their location, but one of my other Amtracs could and asked permission to open up with a mortar which he had. I authorized this, but only with three rounds and only at the roofs of the houses. Two rounds fell short, but the third hit right in the centre of the roof; that was incredible. The British ceased firing then. The Amtrac on the right manoeuvred itself off the road into a little depression and as it did so, disembarked the Marines inside out of view. This encouraged the Royal Marines to think that Marine Mark Gibbs had scored a direct hit on the passenger compartment of the APC.
Lieutenant Bill Trollope, with No. 2 Section, describes the action:
Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down the Airport Road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles, two 84 mm and one 66 mm, missed. Subsequently one 66 mm fired by Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger compartment and one 84 mm Marines Brown and Betts hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle. The remaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and opened fire. We engaged them with GPMG, SLR and sniper rifle [Sergeant Shepherd] for about a minute before we threw white phosphorus a smoke grenade and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens. Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy, but mostly inaccurate.Lieutenant Trollope and his men withdrew along Davis Street, running behind the houses with Argentine Marines in hot pursuit, and went to ground firing up the road when it became obvious they could not reach Government House.
Battle of Government House and surrender
Lying on a small hillock south of Government House, Lieutenant-Commander Giachino faced the difficulty of capturing this important objective with no radio and with a force of only sixteen men. He split his force into small groups, placing one on either side of the house and one at the rear. Unknown to them, the Governors' residence was the main concentration point of the Royal Marines, who outnumbered the Commandos by two to one. The first attack against this building came at 6.30 a.m., barely an hour before the York Bay amphibious landing, when one of Giachino's platoons, led by Lieutenant Gustavo Lugo, started to exchange fire with the British troops inside the house. At the same time, Giachino himself, with four of his subordinates, entered the servants' annexe, believing it to be the rear entrance to the residence. Three Royal Marines, Corporals Sellen and Fleet and Marine Dorey, who were placed to cover the annexe, beat off the first attack. Giachino was hit instantly as he burst through the door, while Lieutenant Diego Garcia Quiroga was shot in the arm. The remaining three retreated to the maid's quarters. Giachino was not dead, but very badly wounded. An Argentine paramedic, Corporal Ernesto Urbina, attempted to get to Giachino but was wounded by a grenade. Giachino seeing what had happened pulled the pin from a live hand grenade and threatened to use it. The Royal Marines then attempted to persuade the officer to get rid of the grenade so that they could give him medical treatment, but he refused, preventing them from reaching his position. After the surrender of the British forces at Government House, some three hours later, Giachino was taken to Stanley Hospital but died from heavy loss of blood.
At the Governor office, Major Norman received a radio report from Corporal York's section, which was positioned at Camber peninsula, observing any possible Argentine ship entering Stanley Harbour.
The Corporal proceeded to report on three potential targets in sight and which should he engage first. What are the targets? the Major enquired. Target number one is an aircraft carrier, target number two is a cruiser..., at which point the line went dead.
Corporal York decided to withdraw his section and proceeded to booby trap their Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, before paddling their Gemini assault boat north across Port William. As he did so, York claimed an Argentine destroyer began pursuing them (the corvette ARA Granville according to Argentine sources). His initiative led to the Gemini reaching an anchored Polish fishing vessel, hiding the small assault boat in its shadow. They patiently waited for a chance, before moving to the shore and landing on a small beach.
Back at Government House, the Argentine Commando's pressure kept unabated. There is some evidence that the use of stun grenades and the continuous shift of firing positions during the battle led the Royal Marines inside to believe they were facing a company of Marines and were hopelessly besieged and outnumbered. Actually, after the failure of Giachino's platoon to break into the residence, the British were surrounded by only a dozen elite troops. These men were under Lieutenant Lugo, Giachino's 2IC. The Land-Rovers vehicles used by the Marines were disabled by automatic gunfire from the Commandos. Certainly Governor Hunt called Patrick Watts (at the radio station, Radio Stanley), by telephone and said he believed the assaulting force to be the equivalent of a reinforced company:
They must have 200 around us now. They've been throwing grenades at us. They came along very quickly and very close, and then they retreated. Maybe they are waiting until the APCs [Amtracs] come along and they think they'll lose less casualties that way. (Graham Bound, Falkland Islanders At War, 2002).
In consequence, Hunt decided to enter talks with Argentine commanders around 8 o'clock. The liaison was Vice-Commodore Hector Gilobert, the head in the islands of LADE, the Argentine government's airline company. Gilobert and a Governor deputy went to the Argentine HQs displaying a white flag. A de facto ceasefire was put in place at that time which was occasionally breached by sniper and small arms fire.
While the negotiations were still going on, another incident occurred inside the residence. Three Argentine survivors of the first skirmish along the compound inadvertently alerted Major Noott to their presence, while they had been preparing to leave their hiding place. The Major fired his machine gun into the maid's room ceiling. According to British reports, the stunned Commandos tumbled down the stairs, laying their weapons on the ground. They became the first Argentine POWs of the Falklands War, albeit by then, as mentioned above, Governor Hunt had already been in contact with Argentine officials negotiating the terms of surrender. The Argentine version is that the three men kept their fighting position right to the end of the hostilities.
Meanwhile, the Governor envoys reached the Argentine commanding post in Stanley. The Argentine chief accepted the British offer of a face to face meeting with Rex Hunt in his battered office.
Shortly after, the Royal Marines in the House saw the approaching Amtracs that had earlier on been engaged by Lieutenant Trollope and his section. They pushed on toward Moody Brook to link up with Sanchez-Sabarots, whose Commandos were plodding slowly along the road to reinforce their colleagues besieging Government House, taking some prisoners in the process. Major Norman had earlier advised Rex Hunt that the Royal Marines and the Governor could break out to the countryside and set up a 'seat of government' elsewhere, but when he finally met the commander-in-chief of the Argentine operations, Admiral Busser, he agreed to surrender his troops to the now overwhelming Argentine forces at 9:30 AM.
Corporal York's section remained at large. On the 4th of April, his platoon reached a secluded shepherd's hut owned by a Mrs Watson. He had no radio, and due to worries about possible civilian deaths chose to surrender to Argentine forces. They gave their position to the Argentines using a local islander's radio, and York subsequently ordered his men to destroy and then bury their weapons.
After the surrender, the Royal Marines and the members of the FIDF were then herded onto the playing fields. Pictures and film were taken of the British prisoners arranged face-down on the ground, which galvanised the British public when they were broadcast on television. The Argentine intention appeared to have been to show the lack of British casualties, but the images became a painful reminder of a national humiliation. Soon afterwards, the Royal Marines were moved to a C-130 transport aircraft, which would take them to Uruguay and on to the United Kingdom. Members of FIDF were not taken to Argentina along with members of NP 8901; instead they were disarmed and returned to their homes.
In Buenos Aires, huge flag-waving crowds flooded the Plaza de Mayo upon hearing the news. Argentina's losses in the operation were one dead and three wounded. In London, where the bad news were fully known from Argentine sources, the government was in a state of shock on what was dubbed as "Black Friday".
The next day, Argentine forces captured the island chain of South Georgia, 1500 km to the east of the Falklands. In that action, the Argentines suffered one sailor from the corvette ARA Guerrico and two Marines killed (Navy Corporal Patricio Guanca and Marines conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Aguila). One British Marine was wounded when his position was fired on by the Guerrico's 40 mm cannons.
Operation Timeline- A. 21:30 1 April - The Type 42 destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad begins loading marines of the Amphibious Commandos Group into 21 small inflatable motor boats. These set out for Mullet Creek but sail too far north and are caught up in beds of Kelp, which cause problems for the boats. They decide to head for the nearest beach, which is near Lake Point.
- B. 23:00 1 April - The first group of 84 men lands on an unnamed beach at Lake Point. The group splits into a smaller force commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Giachino which heads towards Government House, and a larger force commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots which heads towards Moody Brook Barracks.
- C. 04:30 2 April - A small advanced team of the Tactical Divers Group is landed undetected from the Submarine ARA Santa Fe at Yorke Bay.
- D. 05:30 2 April - Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots force reaches and surrounds the Barracks. They throw tear gas grenades into the buildings and fire machine gun tracer over the buildings. They find the buildings are deserted.
- E. 06:00 2 April - 20 FMC Amtracs and several LARC-V stores-carrying vehicles land on Yorke Bay from the assault ship ARA Cabo San Antonio. The force splits into 3 groups:
o A four Amtrac vanguard. Including one carrying the Army Platoon.
o The main force of 14 Amtracs.
o The second in command, a recovery Amtrac and LARC vehicles.
- F. 06:30 2 April - The first Amtracs meet no resistance. The Army platoon captures the deserted airport.
- G. 06:30 2 April - A 16-man Argentine force reaches Government House, where they are stopped by 31 Royal Marines, 11 armed Royal Navy personnel and 1 local. Three Argentines are wounded (one would later die), and other three are later captured inside the House, although by then (around 8:00) talks with Argentine officials about the surrender had already begun.
- H. 07:15 2 April - Having met no resistance, the Argentine Amtracs advance on Stanley, when they are ambushed from a house about 500 metres from the road. Royal Marines use rockets and machine gun fire. The Royal Marines fall back to government house. One of the Amtracs is scarred by machine gun fire, and there is one minor injury.
- I. 08:30 2 April - The Argentine Amtrac force secures Stanley.
- J. Argentine Navy divers begin clearing the runway and seize the lighthouse.
War
By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up an airbase at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic island of Ascension, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2 refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.
Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south. One of these flights was intercepted outside the British self-imposed exclusion zone, by a Sea Harrier; the unarmed 707 was not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to war.
Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe
The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April. The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but — with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in — the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier. The first Royal Naval Ship to arrive was 42 type destroyers HMS Glasgow.
On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine. On 25 April the ARA Santa Fe was spotted by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS Antrim, which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed it with its pintle-mounted General Purpose Machine Gun; the Wessex also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance fired AS-12 ASM anti-ship missiles at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from submerging. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.
With the Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British force, the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was "Please inform Her Majesty, that the white ensign flies alongside the union flag on the isle of South Georgia. God save the Queen". Prime Minister Thatcher broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"
Black Buck raids
The Operation Black Buck raids were a series of five attacks on the Islands by RAF Avro Vulcan bombers of 44 Squadron, staged from Wideawake airbase on Ascension Island, close to the equator. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, as the raids consumed precious tanker resources and did minimal damage to the runway but post-war propaganda states, that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw Mirage IIIs from the Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. It has been suggested that the Black Buck raids were pressed home by the Royal Air Force. The British armed forces had been cut in the late seventies, and the RAF may have desired a greater role in the conflict to prevent further cuts. A single crater was produced on the runway, rendering it impossible for the airfield to be used by fast jets. Argentine ground crew repaired the runway within twenty-four hours and produced fake craters to confound British damage assessment.
On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack on the airfield at Stanley. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight re-fuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted Handley Page Victor bombers with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in the air. Thus, a total of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a huge logistical effort, given that both the tankers and bombers had to use the same strip. The attack yielded only a single hit on the runway.
The raids, at almost 8,000 nautical miles (13 000 km) and 16 hours for the return journey, were the longest-ranged bombing raids in history at that time (surpassed in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 by USAF Boeing B-52G Stratofortresses flying from the continental United States but using forward-positioned tankers) They are often credited with the strategic success of causing the Argentine Air Force ("Fuerza Aerea Argentina") to withdraw all their Mirage IIIEA aircraft to protect against the possibility of similar bombing raids on the Argentine mainland. However, according to the FAA version, Group 8 Mirages were deployed to Comodoro Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos in April (before the raids) where they remained until June to protect against any Chilean threat and as reserve for the strike units. Their lack of aerial refuel capability and a smaller internal fuel capacity, as compared to the IAI Daggers, prevented them from being used effectively over the islands, as was shown by their only engagement of the war on May 1, so they were relegated to mainland duties. Concerned about the possibility of Chilean strikes or SAS raids, the FAA was forced to disperse its aircraft in the areas surrounding their southern airfields. For example, several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose.
Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine Fleet Air Arm BAE Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1s from HMS Hermes followed up the raid by dropping BL755 cluster bombs on Stanley and the smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. The Harriers destroyed one FMA IA 58 Pucará at Goose Green and caused minor damage to Stanley airfield infrastructure. The remaining runways were fully operational through the rest of the conflict. Other Sea Harriers had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible for combat air patrols, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all back."
The Argentines nevertheless claimed that two Sea Harriers were downed that morning in the general area of Stanley. The Commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre, gave the serial numbers of the two Sea Harriers as XZ 458 and XZ 491. Claiming the first to a 35 mm gun and the second to a Roland missile. This claim has been dismissed by a number of English language sources
Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using Shrike air-to-surface antiradiation missiles.
Escalation of the air warThe Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway at the capital, Stanley, and even it was too short to support fast jets. Therefore, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) was forced to launch its major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering its efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.
The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks, Israel Aircraft Industries Daggers, English Electric B Mk 62 Canberras and Dassault Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop-up profile.
Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by Sea Harriers operating from HMS Invincible. A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.
Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but without enough fuel to return to its mainland airfield. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.
As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, who was the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the War.
Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defense) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Franco-German Roland) and Swiss-built 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. Lockheed Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict. The few RN Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in night-time blockade operations, and their Blue Fox radar was not an effective look-down over land radar. The only Argentine Air Force Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last of SP-2H Neptune due to airframe attrition.
Sinking of BelgranoTwo separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighborhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World War II vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix, a survivor of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror, captained by Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, sank Belgrano on May 2 using Mk 8 Mod 4 torpedoes of WWII-vintage design; these were chosen as they carried a larger warhead and contact fuses and there were worries surrounding the reliability of the newer Mk 24 torpedo stock. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict, and the Belgrano remains the only ship ever sunk by a nuclear submarine in combat.
In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral. At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on May 1. Two Sea Lynxes fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew were never found.
Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the vessel that sank. The Rupert Murdoch-owned British tabloid newspaper The Sun greeted the initial reports of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was published before news was known that the Belgrano had actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the more tempered "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".
The loss of ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government and also became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners (such as Labour MP Tam Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. The vessel was outside the exclusion zone, and sailing away from the area of conflict. However, during war, under international law, the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status. In addition, the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, has testified that the attack was legitimate. In later years it has been claimed that the information on the position of the ARA General Belgrano came from a Soviet spy satellite which was tapped by the Norwegian intelligence service station at Fauske, Norway, and then handed over to the British. However, Conqueror had been shadowing the Belgrano for some days, so this extra information would have been unnecessary.
The sinking occurred 14 hours after Constitutional President of the Republic of Peru Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed a comprehensive peace plan and called for regional unity. With the comprehensive failure of diplomatic efforts to that point and so without any hope that additional diplomatic efforts would lead anywhere, and with the knowledge that the delay that would be incurred by such efforts would eliminate the military option due to the closing winter weather, this plan was not entertained by the UK.
Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect; the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centered on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. The attack on Belgrano was the first kill made by a nuclear submarine and only the second submarine kill since the end of the Second World War, the other being made by PNS Hangor, a diesel electric submarine during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.
British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman stated in the second volume of his Official History of the Falklands that intelligence about the Belgrano did not reach senior British commanders and politicians until the order to sink her was passed. Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, informed the Admiralty four hours before his attack that the Argentine cruiser had changed course, but this information was not passed to the Ministry of Defence or Rear-Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward (commander of the RN task force).
Sinking of HMS Sheffield
Two days after the sinking of Belgrano, on May 2, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in order to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were detected by an Argentine Navy P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two Dassault Super Étendards (serial no. 202 and 203) were launched from their base at Río Grande, each armed with a single Exocet AM39 missile. Refuelled by an Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped up for a radar check at 50 miles (80 km) and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away.
Glasgow, Sheffield’s sister ship and the northernmost of the three-destroyer picket, had detected the two Étendards on their first pop-up, and warned the fleet-wide anti-air warfare coordinator in Hermes. Hermes dismissed the report as one of the many false alarms already that morning. Glasgow continued to monitor that bearing and detected the second pop-up, and this time the tell-tale Exocet seeker radar via the ship's ESM equipment. Again Hermes ruled the detection as spurious, but Glasgow continued to broadcast handbrake, the codeword for Exocet radar detected.
The first missile missed HMS Yarmouth, due to her deployment of chaff in response to the warning, whilst Glasgow repeatedly tried, without success, to engage the other with Sea Dart missiles. Still Hermes ruled that this was a false alarm.
Sheffield was unable to detect directly the seeker radar as, in a case of bad timing, the SCOT satellite communications terminal was in use which deafened the onboard electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment. She did not detect the missile on radar due to her radar being of a similar frequency to that of the Exocet. It is not known why she did not respond to Glasgow's warnings, but no chaff were fired and a ship-wide warning of attack went out only seconds before impact when a watch-keeper (Lieutenant Commander Peter Walpole) identified rocket trails visually.
Sheffield was struck amidships, with devastating effect. Whether the warhead actually exploded is debated, but raging fires started to spread, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. Whilst alongside rendering assistance, Yarmouth repeatedly broke off to fire anti-submarine weaponry in response to Sonar reports of torpedoes in the water (later believed to have been a misdiagnosis of the outboard motor of the small inflatables helping with firefighting), as well as visual reports of torpedoes (in actual fact the Sheffield was ridding herself of torpedoes to prevent explosion).
Sheffield was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on May 10, whilst under tow from Yarmouth, becoming an official war grave. In one sense Sheffield served her purpose as a part of the missile picket line — she took the missile instead of the aircraft carriers.
The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual 'shooting war'.
SAS operations
Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard / Exocet combination, plans were made to use Special Air Service troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The aim was to destroy the missiles and the aircraft that carried them, and to kill the pilots in their quarters. Two plans were drafted and underwent preliminary rehearsal:
- A landing by approximately fifty-five SAS in two C-130 Hercules aircraft directly on the runway at Rio Grande;
- An infiltration of twenty-four SAS by inflatable boats brought within a few miles of the coast by submarine.
Neither plan was implemented; the earlier airborne assault plan attracted considerable hostility from some members of the SAS, who considered the proposed raid a suicide mission. Ironically, the Rio Grande area would be defended by four full-strength battalions of Marine Infantry of the Argentine Marine Corps of the Argentine Navy, some of whose officers were trained in the UK by the SBS years earlier. After the war, Argentine marine commanders admitted that they were waiting for some kind of landing by SAS forces but never expected a Hercules to land directly on their runways, although they would have pursued British forces even into Chilean territory if they were attacked.
A SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the night of May 17, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its target, and the mission was aborted. The pilot flew to Chile and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the Chilean authorities. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention at the time.
On May 14, the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble Island at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airfield for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack aircraft and T-34 Mentors. The raid destroyed the aircraft there.
Landing at San Carlos — Bomb Alley
During the night on May 21, the British made an amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Water, on the north western coast of East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay, known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets.
The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade, including the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment (2 and 3 Para), were put ashore from the amphibious ships and the liner Canberra as follows: 2 Para and 40 Commando were landed at San Carlos Beach, 45 Commando at Ajax Bay, and 3 Para at Port San Carlos. By dawn the next day, they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Stanley.
Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using Canberras until the last day of the war (June 14).
At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on May 21, HMS Antelope on May 21, and MV Atlantic Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents on May 25. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to HMS Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay.[40] HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics. In order to avoid the highest concentration of British air defenses, Argentine pilots were forced to release ordnance from very low altitude.
While the attacks were undoubtedly brave, the low release of the un-retarded bombs (some of which were sold to the Argentine FAA by the British years earlier) meant that many never exploded as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. Simple free-fall bombs will, at low altitude, impact almost directly below the dropping aircraft, therefore there is a minimum safe altitude for release. The pilots would doubtless have been aware of this, but in the heat of bomb alley (the pilots need to avoid a high concentration of anti-aircraft defenses of SAMs and cannons plus the Sea Harriers CAPs) many failed to climb to the necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised fitting of retarding devices, allowing low-level bombing attacks as employed on June 8.
In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blames the BBC World Service for these changes to the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from an MOD official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel H. Jones leveled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by 2 Para. Jones had threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around Goose Green.
Thirteen unexploded bombs hit British ships without detonating. Lord Craig, the former Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: “Six better fuses and we would have lost” although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuses were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too low an altitude.
The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks.
Battle of Goose Green
The Battle of Goose Green (28–29 May 1982) was an engagement of the Falklands War between British and Argentinian forces. Goose Green had little strategic value to the overall aim of recapturing the capital Stanley but, as it was a significant Argentinian position and close to the beachhead at San Carlos, it could not be ignored.
The British force consisted of three companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert 'H' Jones' 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) which had the following support: three 105mm artillery pieces with 960 shells from 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery; one MILAN anti-tank missile platoon; Scout helicopters, and at dusk, air support provided by three Royal Air Force Harriers.
Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones, who allegedly preferred to simply be called 'H', due to his dislike of his given name (although few NCO or other ranks agree that he was ever known to them as 'H', but more likely 'Colonel Jones') commanded 2 PARA. Jones' style of command was no doubt an inspiration to his troops, but more recent appraisals of his plan, action and execution of the battle for the isthmus, have indicated that there were various shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of the battle.
The defending Argentinian forces known as Task Force Mercedes consisted of the Lieutenant-Colonel Italo Piaggi's 12th Infantry Regiment (RI 12) and a company of the Ranger-type 25th Infantry Regiment (RI 25). Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin, considered by many Argentinians to be the 'father' of the Argentinian Commandos, who chafing at his role as Commanding Officer of an ordinary infantry unit, put all his conscripts through a compressed version of the commando course in March 1982, dressing them in the green berets of the Army Commandos and changing the title of RI 25 unofficially to 25th 'Special' Infantry Regiment. The name 'Special' was picked rather than adopt the US Army 'Ranger' title. The RI 12 conscripts were not properly trained for infantry fighting but were mainly recruited from Guaraní Indian stock of Corrientes Province who generally pride themselves on being a warrior race.
Air defence was provided by a battery of 20mm Rheinmetall and two Oerlikon 35mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion that would be employed in a ground support role. There was also one battery of four 105mm Oto Melara pack howitzers from the 4th Airborne Artillery Regiment. Pucaras based at Stanley, armed with rockets and napalm, provided ground support.
Just after 2.30 am on 28 May, 2 Para launched its attack on the Argentinians to capture Goose Green 'before breakfast'. RI 12's A Company defended the Darwin Parks sector with two rifle platoons, and a mortar platoon. For ninety minutes the forward Argentinian platoons were pounded with naval artillery. In the ensuing night battle about twelve Argentinians were killed. Major Philip Neame's D Company was temporarily halted by the Coronation Ridge position. One of his men, Lance-Corporal Mike Perkins darted out from under cover to charge the enemy machine gun nest that was holding up the advance. He was ten metres from the machine gun when he shot up the whole crew before realising how he exposed he was. He later said that he thought it had started to rain agin, then realised that the splashes were in fact bullets falling around him. He was awarded the Military Medal. With the enemy machine gun out of action, the Paras were able to clear the Argentinian position with minimal losses.
2 Para moved on to the south via Darwin Parks. The Argentinians made a determined stand along Darwin Ridge. As A and B Companies moved south from Coronation Ridge they were raked by fire from a couple of concealed Argentinian FN MAG machine guns. An Argentinian senior NCO, Company Sergeant-Major Juan Cohelo, is credited with rallying the RI 12's A Company remnants falling back from Darwin Parks. He was seriously wounded later in the day. The first British assault was broken up by fire from Sub-Lieutenant Ernesto Peluffo's RI 12 platoon. Corporal Osvaldo Olmos, of RI 25 refused to leave his foxhole and continued firing at the British company as it moved forward. The Paras called on the Argentinians to surrender.
At this juncture of the battle, 2 Para's advance had become stuck. They were being held up at many points by Argentine resistance that contradicted both the SAS and intelligence remarks of "hit them hard and they will fold", the very words that Jones spoke to his men during his orders group. Jones had pushed his tactical HQ, known as TAC 1, well forward of where an officer conducting a battle should be in order to be able to effectively impose his plan and gain a proper perspective on events. It was at this point, for reasons unknown, Jones decided to personally lead an assault on an entrenched machine gun nest at the crest of a low spur. Followed by his bodyguard, Sergeant Norman, his signaller, Sergeant Blackburn and several officers in his TAC 1 party, including Captains Dent and Wood, he charged the Argentine position. Sgt. Norman recalls calling out to Jones to "watch your fucking back", but Norman believes the OC either didn't hear him, or chose to ignore him. In a documentary filmed after the war, Norman believes that Jones chose to ignore him, as that was his style of leadership. It must be noted that on many training exercises in the UK, Jones had been declared 'KIA' by the umpires during several mock battles, for precisely the same reasons. Jones ran into a small re-entrant (a dip between two hills) and carried on running up to the crest towards the machine gun position. After stopping to reload his submachine gun halfway up the hill, he pushed on, only to be shot in the back by an Argentine gunner, Jose Louis Rios, manning a MAG at the right of the Argentine line, on the opposite spur to the trench Jones was charging. Corporal Rios was later fatally wounded in his trench by Corporal Abols firing a 66mm rocket. Jones had been hit in the back and the groin, and despite the efforts of those around him, was dead within the hour. Also killed during this action was the adjutant, Captain Wood, A company's second-in-command Captain Dent and Corporal Hardman. Jones was later to receive the Victoria Cross for his efforts.
By then it was 10.30 am and Major Dair Farrar-Hockley's A Company made a third attempt, but this petered out. Eventually the British company, hampered by the morning fog as they advanced up the slope of Darwin Ridge, were driven back to the gulley by the fire from 2nd Lieutenant Roberto Estevez and his men, who were 1st Platoon, of RI 25's C Company. During this action Lieutenant Estevez directed Argentinian 105mm artillery and 120mm mortar fire that posthumously earned him the Argentine Nation to the Heroic Valour in Combat Cross (CHVC). 2 Para's mortar crews alone fired 1,000 rounds to keep the enemy at bay, and helped stop the Argentinians to get a proper aim at the Paras (source: Peter Harclerode, PARA!: Fifty Years of the Parachute Regiment, p. 329, Arms & Armour Press, 1993).
It was almost noon before the British advance resumed. Inspired by their commanding officer's sacrifice, A Company soon cleared the eastern end of the Argentinian position and opened the way forward. There had been two battles going on in the Darwin hillocks - one around Darwin Hill looking down on Darwin Bay, and an equally fierce one in front of Boca Hill (also known as Boca House Ruins). Sub-Lieutenant Guillermo Aliaga's 3rd Platoon of RI 8's C Company held Boca Hill. The position of Boca Hill was taken after heavy fighting by Major John Crosland's B Company with support from the Milan anti-tank platoon. About the time of the victory at the Boca Hill position, A Company overcame the Argentinian defenders on Darwin Hill, finally taking the position that had caused many casualties on both sides. Majors Farrar-Hockley and Crosland each won the Military Cross for their efforts. Corporal David Abols received a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his daring charges which turned the Darwin Hill battle.
After the victory on Darwin Ridge, C and D Companies began to make their way to the small airfield as well as Darwin School, which was east of the airfield, while B Company made their way south of Goose Green Settlement. A Company remained on Darwin Hill. Lieutenant James Barry's No. 12 Platoon saw some fierce action at the airfield. They were ambushed, but one of his men shot dead two of the attackers, and then reported the events to Major Neame. The platoon sergeant charged the attacking enemy with his machine gun, killing four of them. For his bravery Sergeant John Meredith was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Private Graham Carter won the Military Medal by rallying No. 12 Platoon and leading it forward at bayonet point to take the airfield. The RI 25 platoon fled into the Darwin-Goose Green track and was able to make good its escape. Sergeant Sergio Garcia, of RI 25, single-handedly covered the withdrawal of his platoon during the British counterattack. He was posthumously awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal. C Company had not lost a single man in the Darwin School fighting, but a D Company private was later killed from a burst of Argentinian 35mm anti-aircraft fire, which reduced the building to rubble. Four of D Company and a dozen Argentinians were killed in the attack.
As day became night, two Argentinian Air Force warrant officers who were POWs were sent to the Argentinian commanders at Goose Green by the acting CO of 2 Para, Major Chris Keeble, with the terms of surrender.
"MILITARY OPTIONS
We have sent a PW to you under a white flag of truce to convey the following military options:
1. That you unconditionally surrender your force to us by leaving the township, forming up in a military manner, removing your helmets and laying down your weapons. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the PW under a white flag with him briefed as to the formalities by no later than 0830 hrs local time.
2. You refuse in the first case to surrender and take the inevitable consequences. You will give prior notice of this intention by returning the PW without his flag (although his neutrality will be respected) no later than 0830 hrs local time.
3. In the event and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Geneva Convention and Laws of War you will be held responsible for the fate of any civilians in Darwin and Goose Green and we in accordance with these terms do give notice of our intention to bombard Darwin and Goose Green.
C. KEEBLE Commander of British Forces"
'Juliet' Company, 42 Commando (composed mainly of members of Naval Party 8901) was flown to Darwin to reinforce 2 Para and at the same time plans were made that night for 'Bravo' Company, 6th Regiment to be taken by helicopter to Goose Green in a spoiler move.
The following day Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi surrendered all Argentinian forces, approximately 1,000 men, including 202 men of the Argentinian Air Force. He would be later drummed out of the army in disgrace. Major Keeble was awarded the Distinguished Service Order. The fourteen-hour battle had cost the British seventeen killed and sixty-four wounded, the majority from 2 Para. Around fifty Argentinians were killed and 120 wounded. After the battle vast quantities of Argentine weapons and unused ammunition were deployed among ships of the Royal Navy still stationed at San Carlos Water.
From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para (approximately 500 men) with Artillery support from 8 Alma Cdo Bty, approached and attacked Darwin and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle, which lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops (including around 350 FAA non-combatant personnel of the Condor airfield [46]) taken prisoner. The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlos bridgehead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet.
Special Forces on Mount KentMeanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 May and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe missiles and commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative). For the next week, the Special Air Service (SAS) and Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre of 3 Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally 2IC of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them — Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook — in responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss through small-arms fire.
On the 31 May, the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) defeated Argentine Special Forces at the Battle of Top Malo House. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain Jose Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The Argentine Commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed 200 metres from the burning house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were two dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol, brandishing a large Union Flag. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.
It is estimated that 40 Argentine Commandos were involved in the battle with the SAS and the Cadre at Top Malo House and Mount Kent. A body count revealed four bullet-ridden Argentine Army 602nd Commando Company killed in the firefights. Seven members of the British Special Forces were wounded during these actions. One Special Boat Service (SBS) sergeant was killed as the Mount Kent ranges were secured for the arrival of the British battalions. As a result of Major Mario Castagneto's extraordinary efforts, his 601st Commando Company was able to move forward on their Kawasaki motorbikes and commandeered Landrovers, under heavy mortar fire, and rescue the trapped 602s on the slopes of Mount Kent. Major Castagneto was awarded the CHVC for this overland rescue and was wounded in the mortar bombardment when a piece of shrapnel cut through his belt buckle. The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the Argentine Army 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11.00 a.m. on 30 May, an Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by the SAS in the vicinity of Mount Kent in which six National Gendarmerie Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.
As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."
Bluff Cove and FitzroyBy June 1, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanley.
During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. 32 of the dead were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram on June 8. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston.
The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).
This uncoordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a 30-mile (48 km) string of indefensible positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh Guards were to be ferried from San Carlos Water in the amphibious assault ship Sir Tristram and the landing platform dock (LPD) Intrepid on the night of 5 June. Intrepid was planned to stay one day and unload itself and as much of Sir Tristram as possible, leaving the next evening for the relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day, after which Sir Tristram would be left to unload using an inflatable platform known as a Mexeflote for as long as it took to finish.
Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Mike Clapp (Commander, Amphibious Forces) to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but without suitable beaches on which to land, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with Intrepid and Fearless (her sister ship) sailing half-way to dispatch their craft was devised. The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards had failed, possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and were landed directly at Bluff Cove when Fearless dispatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed on the night of June 6 and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on June 7.
Anchored 1,200 feet (370 m) apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the designated landing point. The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to that point relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered disembarcation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting his troops be ferried the far longer distance directly to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The intention was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentine combat engineers) to their destination, a journey of around seven miles (11 km).
The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops directly to Bluff Cove and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused enormous delay in unloading. This had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established their air defence and still almost fully laden, the two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentine FAA A-4 Skyhawks.
The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships.
Battle to Mount HarrietThe Battle to Mount Harriet was an engagement of the Falklands War which took place on the night of 11/12 June 1982 between British and Argentine forces. It was one of three battles in a brigade-sized operation on the same night.
The British force consisted of 42 Commando (42 CDO), Royal Marines under the command of Lt. Col. Nick Vaux Royal Marines (who later became a general) with artillery support from a battery of 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery. The 1st Battalion, Welsh Guards (1WG) and two companies from 40 CDO were in reserve. HMS Yarmouth provided naval-gunfire support for the British forces. The Argentinian defenders consisted of Lieutenant-Colonel Diego Soria's 4th Infantry Regiment (RI 4).
On the night of 30 May, K Company of 42 CDO moved forward of San Carlos to secure the commanding heights of Mount Kent, at 1,504 feet the tallest of the peaks surrounding Stanley, where the D Squadron SAS Troops had already established a strong presence. However when these arrived at their landing zone some 3 kilometres (2 miles) behind the ridge of the mountain, the Marines were surprised to see the flashes and lines of tracer ammunition light up the night . After a fierce fight at close quarters the Argentine patrol (Captain Tomas Fernandez's 2nd Assault Section, 602 Commando Company) melted away from the boulders and snow-soaked scrub and grass. By the end of May Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron had gained Mount Kent and Tactical HQ commenced patrolling Bluff Cove Peak which they took with a loss of two wounded.
The attack was preceded by many days of observation and nights of patrolling. Some night-fighting patrols were part of a deception plan to convince the Argentinians that the attack would come from a westerly direction. Other, more covert, patrols were to find a route through a minefield around the south of Mount Harriet. Sniping and naval artillery were used to harass the defenders and deny them sleep.
On 3 June Lieutenant Chris Marwood's Reconnaissance Troop of 42 CDO patrolling forward from Mount Challenger encountered an RI 4 fighting patrol (3rd Platoon of B Company). Two of the conscripts (Privates Celso Paez and Roberto Ledesma) were instantly killed in a withering burst of rifle fire, and an NCO (Corporal Nicolas Odorcic) went down wounded to a head shot by one of the Marine snipers as he took cover among the rocks. The Royal Marines were taken completely by surprise when another Argentinean platoon joined in the movement and a general counter-attack developed. Captain Nick D' Appice remembers:
We were separated from our heavy bergans with the radios and all our gear. The patrol was spread over quite a large area, with lots of shouting, noise and firing going on. The Marines abandoned all their equipment, and although no one told us, it became clear that we were to withdraw. With no information, and the likelihood of having to fight our way out, Dave Greedus and I decided to abandon our equipment, destroying as much as we could. The two radio sets (HF and UHF) were tough enough, but the HAZE unit of the laser target marker was designed to withstand the weight of a tank! (Hugh McManners, The Scars of War, p. 238, Harper Collins Publishers, 1993)
The Laser Target Designator retrieved in the contact showed that the Royal Marines were seeking to destroy the Argentinean bunkers on Mount Harriet with 1,000-pound Pave Way Laser Guided Bombs
On the night of 8-9 June, action on the outer-defence-zone flared when Lieutenant Mark Townsend's 1 Troop (K Company, 42 CDO) probed Mount Harriet, killing two Argentines. At the same time two platoon-sized fighting patrols from 45 Commando attempted the same on Two Sisters Mountain, but the Argentinean Rasit ground surveillance radar there was able to detect the 45 Commando platoons and artillery fire dispersed the force.
Over a period of a week the 4th Regiment defended the Harriet-Two Sisters sector from five Royal Marine platoon-sized attacks. Everytime the Royal Marine Commandos got into the forward platoon positions the officers, NCOS and conscripts counterattacked with rifles and cleared them out.
On the morning of the 11 June the orders for the attack were given to 42 CDO by Vaux; K Company were ordered to attack the eastern end of the mountain while L Company would attack the southern side an hour later, where it, if the mountain was secured, would then move north of Mount Harriet to Goat Ridge. J Company would launch a diversionary attack (codenamed Vesuvius) on the western end of Mount Harriet.
In the closing hours of the 11 June, K and L Companies moved from their assembly area on Mount Challenger (which lay to the west of Mount Harriet) and made their way south, around their objective, across the minefield, to their respective start lines. As they moved around the feature in the dark, J company launched their very loud diversionary "attack" from the west.
The battle for Mount Harriet began on the evening of 11 June with a blistering naval bombardment which killed two Argentines and wounded twenty-five. John Witheroe, one of the British war correspondents, later recalled the softening up fire:
We were involved with one night attack on Mount Harriet, when the Welsh Guards were coming up as a back-up. This involved marching for several hours on a very dark night, through a minefield. Sporadic shellfire slowed our progress tremendously. Eventually we made the base of Mount Harriet, which was coming under incredible fire from a frigate ashore. The whole mountain seemed to erupt in flame. It seemed impossible that anybody could survive an attack like that. This went on for well over an hour, shell after shell whistling over our heads and hitting the mountain. Eventually this was lifted and the Marines went in. To our amazement there seemed to be an incredible amount of fighting going on. There was a lot of tracer fire. The whole night was being lit up by flares, which cast a dead, unrealistic, pall over the whole scene. (Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, p. 271, Andre Deutsch, 1989)
Captain Peter Babbington's K Company crossed their start-line first and proceeded up the mountain undetected, knifing two sentries on the way. They remained undetected until they approached Sub-Lieutenant Mario Juarez's 120-mm Mortar Platoon positions and decided to engage them. They were assisted in the advance by HMS Yarmouth, artillery and mortars. During the engagement Corporal Larry Watts was killed. About 150 metres from Soria's HQ, Corporal Steve Newland circled behind a group of Argentines who were setting up an ambush. Although half a dozen Argentines and a MAG were placed to massacre anyone who broke cover, Newland darted out from under cover to charge the enemy machine gun. He grenaded two of the crew, but reaching the rear of the machine gun position, he was shot through both legs. With the enemy machine gun out of action, Corporals Mick Eccles and Sharky Ward were able to clear the position without losses. The three corporals were awarded the Military Medal. Increasing numbers of Argentine soldiers, mainly conscripts from RI 4's Recce Platoon began to surrender, but the Commanding Officer and Intelligence Officer and several senior NCOs still fought on according to their orders. The heavy machinegun platoon to a man stood in its positions and raked the Royal Marine Commandos with bullets.
L Company crossed their start line shortly after K Company and were almost immediately engaged by effective machine gun fire from Sub-Lieutenant Pablo Oliva's platoon defending the lower southern slopes. These weapons would not be silenced until being hit by several MILAN anti-tank missiles and six 105 mm artillery guns from Mount Challenger. The L Company Marines contend they took fire from at least seven machine guns that only wounded five men, but as Hugh Bicheno detailed in Razor's Edge (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), the 4th Regiment's passive night goggles were all with B Company.
Before first light Lieutenant Jerry Burnell's 5 Troop of L Company proceeded to an outcrop of rocks towards Goat Ridge. As they advanced the Royal Marine platoon came under heavy fire from Sub-Lieutenant Lautaro Gimenez Corvalan's 3rd Platoon and were forced to withdraw. L Company requested artillery fire onto the Argentinian platoon position, then 4 Troop moved forward and found that the Argentinians had withdrawn. Further fighting went on throughout the morning of 12 June and a fanatically brave conscript, in a position just below the summit, held up L Company with accurate shooting until killed by an 84 mm anti-tank rocket fired at short range.
The battle was a textbook example of good planning and use of deception and surprise, and a further step towards their main objective of Stanley. British casualties were two killed and twenty-six wounded. Eighteen Argentinean dead lay around the defences. Lance-Corporal Koleszar had the surprising experience of finding that two 'dead' Argentine soldiers, whose boots he was trying to remove, were very much alive and jumped up to surrender. Some British reporters were thus misled into depicting the Argentinians as hapless teenage conscripts who caved in after the first shots were fired, but Royal Marine Warrant Officer 2 John Cartledge who served with L Company during the battle corrected them, saying the Argentinians were good soldiers who had fought properly:
"They used the tactics which they had been taught along the way very well, they were quite prepared for an attack. They put up a strong fight from start to finish. They were also better equipped than we were. We had first generation night sights, which were large cumbersome pieces of equipment, while the Argentines had second generation American night sights that were compact and so much better than what we had. The one deficiency which we exposed was that they had planned for a western end of the mountain attack, and therefore had not bothered to extend their defensive positions to the eastern end, where we ultimately attacked’"
One British general put their success down to his Marines' skill and professionalism:
"What was needed was speed but not being bloody stupid. The Israelis would have done it much faster, but with many more casualties". (Robert Fox, Eyewitness Falklands, p. 296)
42 Commando captured 300 prisoners on Mount Harriet and for the bravery shown in the attack, the unit was awarded one DSO, one Military Cross, four Military Medals and eight men were Mentioned in Dispatches.
Battle of Two SistersThe Battle of Two Sisters was an engagement of the Falklands War during the British advance towards the capital Stanley that took place on the 11/12 June 1982.
The British force consisted of 45 Commando (45 CDO), Royal Marines under Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Whitehead (who later became a general) with support from six 105 mm guns of 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery. 2 PARA was in reserve. Naval gunfire-support was provided by HMS Glamorgan's 2 x 4.5 inch (114 mm) guns. The Argentinian force consisted of the 4th Infantry Regiment (RI 4). Command of Two Sisters was entrusted to Major Ricardo Cordón, second in command of RI 4, with the bulk of the defenders drawn from C Company with the 1st Platoon (Sub-Lieutenant Miguel Mosquera) and 2nd Platoon (Sub-Lieutenant Jorge Pérez Grandi) on the northern peak and the 3rd Platoon (Sub-Lieutenant Marcelo Llambias) on the southern peak and the 1st Platoon A Company (Sub-Lieutenant Juan Nazer) and Support Platoon (Second Lieutenant Luis Carlos Martella) on the saddle between the two peaks. Major Óscar Jaimet's B Company of the 6th Regiment occupied the saddle between Two Sisters and Mount Longdon.
On 4 June the three companies of 45 CDO advanced on Bluff Cove Peak, on the lower slopes of Mount Kent, and was able to occupy the feature without opposition and was met by patrols from the SAS. Enemy opposition was desultory but on the night of 29 May a fierce firefight developed in taking the two important hills, that were intended to form part of an Argentine Special Forces line. Captain Andrés Ferrero's patrol (3rd Assault Section, 602 Commando Company) made the base of Mount Kent but were then promptly pinned by machinegun and mortar fire. One Argentine NCO was wounded. Air Troop had two wounded from rifle fire. Probing attacks around the D Squadron positions continued throughout the night and at 11:00 AM on 30 May, about 12 Argentine Commandos tried to get up the summit of Bluff Cove Peak, but were driven off by D Squadron SAS which killed two of the party, First Lieutenant Rubén Eduardo Márquez and Sergeant Óscar Humberto Blas. First Lieutenant Márquez and Sergeant Blas showed great personal courage and leadership in the contact and were subsequently awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal . During this contact the SAS suffered two casualties from grenades. The Argentine Commandos literally stumbled on a camp occupied by 15 SAS troopers, according to special forces historian Martin Arostegui who wrote Twilight Warriors: Inside The World's Special Forces (p. 205, Bloomsbury, 1995). Throughout 30 May Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them in responding to a call for help from D Squadron attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes and that led to its loss through small-arms fire.
A heavy mist hung over the Murrell River area and this assisted the 45 Commando Recce Troop to reach and sometimes penetrate the Argentine 3rd Platoon position under Sub-Lieutenant Marcelo Llambias. Marine Andrew Tubb of Recce Troop was on these patrols:
“We were actually inside the Argentine position, so we ended up shelling ourselves. We did a lot of patrols up to Two Sisters ... that time [6 June] we pepper-potted [retreated] for about 400 metres to get out [the 3rd Platoon sergeant, Ramón Valdez, had launched a counterambush], through the Argy lines firing 66 [mm] rockets to fight through and regroup. We got artillery again to smoke us out. It took us well over an hour to get away and it seemed like a few minutes. We killed seventeen of them [two Army privates and three Sappers of a Marine mine-laying party were actually killed], and all we had was one bloke with a flesh wound”.
[Robin Neillands, By Sea & Land: The Story of the Royal Marine Commandos, p. 402, Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2000]
For his patrol action, Lieutenant Chris Fox received the Military Cross. In general terms, the Argentines were thoroughly entrenched, about 6000 metres or less across a no-man's-land. The Argentine positions were mined and patrolled heavily.
At about 2.10 am local time on 10 June a strong 45 Commando fighting patrol probed the 3rd Platoon position. In the ensuing fight Special Forces Sergeants M. Cisneros and R. Acosta were killed; two more Argentinean Special Forces laying in ambush for the Royal Marines were wounded. The British military historian Bruce Quarrie wrote later:
A constant series of patrols was undertaken at night to scout out and harass the enemy. Typical was the patrol sent out in the early hours of the morning of 10 June. Lieutenant David Stewart of X-Ray Company, 45 Commando, had briefed his men during the previous afternoon, and by midnight they were ready. Heavily armed, with two machine-guns per section plus 66 mm rocket launchers and 2-inch [described by the British as 81 mm] mortars, the Troop moved off stealthily into the moonlit night towards a ridge some 4 km away where Argentine movement had been observed. Keeping well spaced out because of the good visibility, they moved across the rocky ground using the numerous shell holes for cover, and by 04.00 [1 am local time] were set to cross the final stretch of open ground in front of the enemy positions. Using a shallow stream for cover, they moved up the slope and deployed into position among the rocks in front of the Argentine trenches. With the help of a light-intensifying night scope, they could see sentries moving about. Suddenly, an Argentine machine-gun opened fire and the Marines launched a couple of flares from their [81 mm] 2-inch mortars, firing back with their own machine- guns and rifles. Within seconds three Argentine soldiers and two Marines were dead. Other figures could be seen running on the hill to the left, and four more Argentine soldiers fell to the accuracy of the Marines' fire. By this time, the Argentine troops further up the slope were wide awake, and a hail of fire forced the Marines to crouch in the shelter of the rocks. The situation was becoming decidedly unhealthy and Lieutenant Stewart decided to retire, with the objective of killing and harassing the enemy well and truly accomplished. However, a machine-gun to the Marines' right was pouring fire over their getaway route, and Stewart sent his veteran Sergeant, Jolly, with a couple of other men to take it out [They knew they were cut off with what looked a poor chance of escape. In these circumstances any panic or break in morale and the game was up]. After a difficult approach with little cover, there was a short burst of fire and the Argentine machine-gun fell silent. Leapfrogging by sections, the Troop retreated to the stream, by which time the Argentine fire was falling short and there were no further casualties.
[Bruce Quarrie, The Worlds Elite Forces, pp.53-54, Octopus Books Limited, 1985]
Major Aldo Rico, commander of the 602 Commando Company himself had a lucky escape when an enemy rocket exploded uncomfortably close. Sadly for 45, on the night of 9-10 June there was an unfortunate mistake made in the dark and friendly fire was exchanged resulting in British casualties.
Captain Ian Gardiner's X-Ray Company spearheaded the attack on Two Sisters, accompanied by the Unit's Commando trained padre, the Revd Wynne Jones. Lieutenant James Kelly's 1 Troop took the western third of the spineback on the southern peak of Two Sisters (Long Toenail) with no fighting taking place. However at 11:30 PM local time (see No Picnic, p.131), Lieutenant David Stewart's 3 Troop ran up against a very determined defence on the spineback and were unable to get forward. Beaten from their attempt to dislodge the Argentine 3rd Platoon, Lieutenant Chris Caroe's 2 Troop threw themselves at the platoon but the attack was dispersed with the help of artillery fire. For three or four hours X Ray Company was pinned down on the slopes of the mountain. Naval gunfire ripped back and forth across the southern peak, but the Argentineans held the Royal Marines off. Colonel Andrew Whitehead realized that a single company could not hope to secure Two Sisters without massive casualties, and brought up the battalion's two other companies.
At about 12:30 AM local time (see No Picnic, p. 132) Yankee and Zulu Companies attacked the northern peak (Summer Days) and after a very hard two hour fight against two platoons and despite heavy machinegun and mortar fire, succeeded in capturing 'Summer Days'. The Z Company platoon commander, Lieutenant Clive Dytor, won the Military Cross by rallying his 8 Troop and leading it forward at bayonet point to take Summer Days. Yankee Company then advanced to attack the final objective capturing all of its objective all the way to the eastern end of Two Sisters. Second Lieutenant Aldo Franco and his RI 6 platoon successfully prevented Yankee Company from attacking the C Company as it withdrew from Two Sisters. Private Oscar Poltronieri who held up Yankee Company with accurate shooting with his rifle and a machinegun, was awarded the Argentine Nation to the Heroic Valour in Combat Cross (CHVC), the highest Argentine decoration for bravery. (Source Martin Middlebrook, The Fight For The Malvinas, Leo Cooper Paperbacks, 2003)
The Argentinean Army Official Report on the war recommended Major Oscar Jaimet and CSM Jorge Pitrella for an MVC (Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal) for their conduct of their fighting withdrawal and subsequent behaviour on Tumbledown (this was later granted to Major Jaimet, Pitrella was awarded the Argentine Army to Military Merit Medal).
The British were highly critical of the Argentinean officers who, they claimed, withdrew from front-line positions at the opening of the battle. Colonel Andrew Whitehead looked in wonderment at the strength of the positions the enemy had abandoned. 'With fifty Royals,' he said, "I could have died of old age holding this place.' (Max Hastings, Going To The Wars, p. 363, Macmillan 2000) For the company and platoon commanders of 45, the battle of Two Sisters had been no pushover, however.
Sergeant-Major George Meachin of Yankee Company, would later praise the fighting abilities and spirit of the Argentinean defenders:
“We came under lots of effective fire from 0.50 calibre machineguns ...At the same time, mortars were coming down all over us, but the main threat was from those machinegunners who could see us in the open because of the moonlight. There were three machineguns and we brought down constant and effective salvoes of our own artillery fire on to them directly, 15 rounds at a time. There would be a pause, and they'd come back at us again. So we had to do it a second time, all over their positions. There'd be a pause, then 'boom, boom, boom,' they'd come back at us again. Conscripts don't do this, babies don't do this, men who are badly led and of low morale don't do this. They were good steadfast troops. I rate them”.
[Bruce Quarrie, op. cit., p. 55, Octopus Books Limited, 1985]
Hugh Bicheno described the moonscape of devastation:
Although Wireless Ridge and the saddle between Tumbledown and William are still heavily scarred, even after more than twenty years the beaten zone between the Two Sisters bear the most eloquent witness to the awesome power of the British artillery, which fired 1,500 shells at the Two Sisters that night. The still-churned area occupied by Nazer's platoon in particular leaves one in no doubt why they decamped immediately, while the saddle itself is dimpled with craters, testimony to the tenacity of Martella's HMGs and mortars.
(Hugh Bicheno, Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, p. 242, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006)
The X-Ray Company Marines were in awe of the depleted 3rd Platoon who had put up such determined resistance, and their company commander in the book Above All, Courage (Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2002) later said:
“A hard cadre of some twenty men had stayed behind and fought, and they were brave men. Those who stayed and fought had something. I for one would not wish to face my Marines in battle”.
Running low on ammunition and with the telephone lines to the command post in shreds, Llambias threw the towel in at 2.30 am and led his men to join M Company 5th Marine Battalion on Sapper Hill.
A lone rifleman on Long Toenail held out long after resistance had ended on the mountain. There was a humorous moment when the Revd Wynne Jones called to his Marines that he was 45 Commandos' padre.
Losses to the Commando had been high. Three Royal Marine Commandos and one Marine from 59 Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers were killed taking Two Sisters and a further four had died in the skirmishes in no-man's-land, bringing the total to eight killed. Another 17, including platoon commanders (Lieutenants Fox, Dunning and Davies) had been wounded. Some 20 Argentineans died in the first eleven days of June and the night of battle. Another 54 Argentineans were taken prisoner. HMS Glamorgan stayed in her position offshore to support the Royal Marine Commandos who were pinned down and there is no doubt the light cruiser saved many British lives. Glamorgan stayed when she was past the time she was meant to leave and was hit by a land based Exocet missile, thirteen sailors were killed as a result of this attack.
For the bravery shown in the attack on Two Sisters, men from 45 Commando were awarded one DSO, three Military Crosses, one DCM and four Military Medals. A commando from 29 Commando received a Military Medal as did a man from the M&AW Cadre.
Battle of Mount Longdon
The Battle of Mount Longdon was an engagement of the Falklands War between British and Argentinian forces, which took place on the 11/12 June 1982, resulting in a British victory.
The British force consisted of 3 PARA under Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike (later a general) with artillery support from six 105 mm light guns of 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery. 2 PARA were in reserve. Naval gunfire support was provided by HMS Avenger's 4.5-in gun. The Argentinian force consisted of B Company of the 7th Infantry Regiment (RI 7), as-well as other detachments from other units. The local Argentinian commander was Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores, the second-in-command of RI 7. The 7th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two of the Marine Infantry platoons, held Mount Longdon, Wireless Ridge and Cortley Ridge to the east.
Mostly conscripts with a year of training, the young RI 7 soldiers were not going to rout the field easily and most were prepared to stand their ground. They possessed fully automatic FAL rifles which delivered more firepower than the British SLR, FN MAG 7.62mm general purpose machineguns identical to those of the Paras; some fifty of the 7th Regiment were to fight more resolutely than the rest, having been trained on a commando course organized by commando-trained Major Oscar Jaimet, the Operations Officer of the 6th Infantry Regiment (RI 6). Private Jorge Altieri, in an interview after the war told how he trained hard with B Company:
'I was issued with a FAL 7.62 millimetre rifle. Other guys were given FAPs – light machineguns – and others got PAMS [submachineguns]. The main emphasis in shooting was making every bullet count. I was also shown how to use a bazooka, how to make and lay booby-traps, and how to navigate at night, and we went on helicopter drills, night and day attacks and ambushes.
The 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, made a desperate march across the hills north of Mount Simon to seize the key piece of high ground above the settlement of Estancia, nicknamed Estancia Farm. The weather conditions were atrocious, with the Paras marching through steep slippery hillocks to the objective. Nick Rose was a private in 6 Platoon under Lieutenant Jonathan Shaw.
“The terrain dictated exactly how we advanced. A lot of the time if we were going along on tracks – what few tracks we did go on – we used Indian file, which is staggered file on either side of the track, like a zig zag. But there are great rivers of rock [stone runs] – big white boulders – and you have to cross them and then there's the heather and the gorse and its constantly wet. So the wind chill factor was – I think somebody said minus 40 degrees – and storm force winds and horizontal rain – a nightmare scenario. ... We are horrible, we're miserable as sin, all of us – we're missing home, want a dry fag, warm, dry boots, a cheese and onion sandwich and a bottle of blue top milk. I used to dream of these”.
3 Para set up a patrol base near Murrell Bridge, two kilometres west of Mount Longdon on 3 June. From there they sent out their specialist patrols from D Company to scout out the Argentine positions on Mount Longdon. An example of a snatch patrol that failed to obtain a prisoner was provided by 3 PARA on the night of 4-5 June 1982. A three-man patrol from D Company consisting of Corporal Jerry Phillips and Privates Richard Absolon and Bill Hayward was sent out to the northern slopes of Mount Longdon. The small party was detailed to penetrate Sub-Lieutenant Juan Baldini's 1st Platoon on the western slopes to secure a prisoner, supported to their rear by a battery of six 105 mm field guns, under cover of which the specialist snipers shot at Baldini while another fired a 66 at one of the 1st Platoon mortar pits under Corporal Óscar Carrizo. The Argentine commanders reacted vigorously, and the sniper team found themselves under prompt and accurate machinegun, artillery and mortar fire. There were no Argentinian casualties. One British participant nevertheless claimed to have shot and killed two Argentines and demolished one mortar crew with a 66 mm anti-tank rocket at close range.
On the Argentinian side, it was soon realised that the 7th Infantry Regiment Reconnaissance Platoon soldiers on the surrounding Wireless Ridge position were ill equipped to carry out their own patrolling. Thus, the Argentinian Commando units, normally used for deep-recce had to take on this role. They were able to do so with some success and in the early hours of 7 June a combined patrol of the 601st Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron was seen approaching Murrell Bridge. After several nights in the area Corporals Paul Haddon and Peter Brown and their patrols had just arrived at the bluff on the western bank of the Murrell River which Sergeant Ian Addle's patrol had been using as a base. Within a short space of time a sentry reported moving figures down near the bridge. The Paras opened up and a confused firefight developed in the darkness, with small arms, machinegun, LAW and Energa rifle grenades being exchanged. The Commando patrol under Captain Rubén Figueroa was very aggressive and before dawn had forced the Paras to withdraw, having to leave behind much of their equipment. Only one Argentinian NCO was slightly wounded during the counter-ambush. From then on patrols had to be mounted closer to their own line. As the official history of the Parachute Regiment acknowledged:
“They were forced to evacuate their position rapidly, leaving behind their packs and radio, but succeeded in withdrawing without suffering any casualties. The location was checked on the evening of 8 June by another patrol, but there was no sign of the packs or radio, which meant the battalion's radio net could have been compromised.”
Nevertheless Colonel Pike and his company commanders on the eve of battle still held the Argentine commanders in low regard and did not expect them to put up much resistance. For this reason the British colonel hoped to surprise them by advancing as close to their forward platoon as possible under cover of darkness, before storming into their trenches with fixed bayonets. The three major objectives – Fly Half, Full Back and Wing Forward – were named after positions in Rugby. B Company would attack through Fly Half and proceed to Full Back, while A Company, followed by C Company if necessary, would do the same on Wireless Ridge.
But morale was still good in the 7th Regiment. Private Fabián Passaro of B Company served on Longdon with the 1st Platoon and remembers life at the time:
“Most of us had adjusted to what we'd been landed in, we'd adjusted to the war. But some boys [identified in the book Two Sides Of Hell/Los Dos Lados Del Infierno] were still very depressed and, in many cases, were getting worse all the time. Of course, we were very fed up with wearing the same clothes for so many days, going without a shower, being so cold, eating badly. It was too many things together, quite apart from our natural fear of the war, the shelling and all that. But I think some of us were adapting better than others. There were kids who were very worried; and I tried to buoy them up a bit. 'Don't worry,' I told them. 'Nothing will happen, we're safe here. 'Don't you see they could never get right up here? There's one thousand of us; if they try to climb, we'll see them, we'll shoot the shit out of them.'"
When the 3 PARA's B Company (under Major Mike Argue) fixed bayonets to storm the Argentinian 1st Platoon positions on Mount Longdon, they found themselves running into a minefield. The British sappers later counted some 1,500 anti-personnel mines sown along the western and northern slopes of Mount Longdon, 'but only two exploded' recalled Corporal Peter Cuxson [7], 'because the rest were frozen by ice'. 'Otherwise the final battle for Port Stanley would have been an altogether different story,' concludes the NCO who took an Argentine machine-gun position that night.
As dusk set-in, 3 Para moved to their start-lines and, after a brief stop, began to make their four-hour long advance to their objectives. As B Company approached Mount Longdon Corporal Brian Milne stepped on a mine, which after a very silent approach, alerted Sub-Lieutenant Baldini's platoon of conscripts. More than 20 Argentinan soldiers emerged from their tents to lay down fire but most of the platoon was still struggling out of its sleeping bags when Lieutenant Ian Bickerdike's No. 4 Platoon was among them, machinegunning and grenading the helpless Argentinians. Corporal Stewart McLaughlin was in the thick of the action, clearing out an Argentinian 7.62mm machinegun from the high ground overlooking the western slopes. He mustered his section, ordered them to fix bayonets and then led them up the hill into a hail of machinegun fire.
Lieutenant Jonathan Shaw's No. 6 Platoon, on the right flank of B Company, captured the summit of Fly Half with no fighting. However, they had missed half a dozen of Argentinian conscripts of the forward platoon, having grenaded several abandoned bunkers, and they launched a fierce attack on the unsuspecting platoon, resulting in a number of casualties before the area was cleared. For three hours the hand-to-hand combat raged in the 1st Platoon sector, until the Paras drove out the defenders. All around the 1st Platoon position, small groups of soldiers were fighting for their lives. Privates Ben Gough and Dominic Gray managed to crawl undetected up to an Argentinian bunker and crouched beside it as Marine conscripts Jorge Inchauspe and Héctor Rolla inside blasted away into the night. In unison the two Paras each pulled the pin out of a grenade and posted it through the firing slit of the bunker. The instant the grenade exploded the two jumped in the bunker and started to bayonet the two Marines. Private Gray killed a Marine by sticking his bayonet through his eye socket. Privates Gough and Grey were mentioned in despatches. Baldini himself appears to have been killed as he fired a machinegun. Corporal Dario Ríos was found lying dead with his platoon commander. Baldini's weapon and boots were removed for the use of the British soldiers. A photo of the dead lieutenant appeared in the original hardback edition of the book Operation Corporate. The Story of the Falklands War, 1982 (Viking Press, 1985) Also killed on the western slopes was the Argentinian forward artillery observation officer, Lieutenant Alberto Ramos whose last message was that his position was surrounded.
Just as it seemed as if the Paras would overwhelm 2nd Lieutenant Enrique Neirotti's 3rd Platoon on the southern slopes of the mountain, reinforcements from 2nd Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga's 1st Platoon, 10th Engineer Company on Full Back arrived to help Neirotti. Throughout most of the night Staff Sergeant Raúl González's 2nd Platoon positions on the saddle of the mountain held, the newly arrived engineers using head-mounted nightsights proving particularly deadly to the Paras.
Private Nick Rose in 6 Platoon resumes the story.
“Pete Grey stood up and went to throw a '42' grenade and he was shot by a sniper in his right forearm. We thought the grenade had gone off. We punched his arm down onto the ground to staunch the bleeding, believing he'd lost half his right forearm and hand, but it was still there and his arm bent at the forearm instead of the elbow – a horrible thing to watch. ...There's 'incoming' everywhere, loads of stuff going down the range and then 'bang' my pal 'Fester' [Tony Greenwood], gets it just above his left eye, only a yard away from me. That was a terrible thing. 'Fester' was such a lovely guy. Then it was 'Baz' Barratt. 'Baz' had gone back to try and get field dressings for Pete Grey and he was coming back 'bang' he got it in the back. This was when we just stalled as a platoon.' (Jon Cooksey, op. cit., p. 66)
The battle was going badly for Major Mike Argue. Argentinian resistance was strong and well organized. At the centre of the mountain were Marine conscripts Jorge Maciel and Claudio Scaglione in a bunker with a heavy machinegun and Marine conscripts Luis Fernández and Sergio Giuseppetti with night-scope equipped rifles. Lieutenant Bickerdike and a signaller and Sergeant Ian McKay and a number of other men in No. 4 Platoon were attempting to perform reconnaissance on the Marine positions, in doing so, the platoon commander and signaller were wounded. Sergeant McKay realising something needed to be done, decided to attack the Marine heavy machinegun position that was causing so much trouble and so much misery. The assault was met by a hail of fire. The Corporal was seriously wounded, a Private killed and another wounded. Despite these losses Sergeant McKay, with complete disregard for his own safety for which he was to win posthumously the Victoria Cross, continued to charge the enemy position alone. Peter Harclerode who was granted open access to the war diary of the 3rd Battalion, and subsequently wrote PARA! (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), pointed out that McKay and his team cleared several Marine riflemen in position but failed to neutralize the heavy machinegun.
Corporal McLaughlin himself managed to crawl to within grenade-throwing range of the Marine heavy-machinegun team, but despite several efforts with fragmentation grenades and 66 mm LAW rockets, he was unable to silence it.
Major Carrizo-Salvadores on Full Back had remained in touch with the Argentine commanders in Port Stanley:
“Around midnight I asked RHQ for infantry reinforcements, and I was given a rifle platoon from Captain Hugo García's C Company. First Lieutenant Raúl Fernando Castañeda gathered the sections of his platoon, hooked around First Sergeant Raúl González's 2nd Platoon that was already fighting and delivered a counterattack [at about 2 am local time]. The Platoon fought with great courage in fierce hand to hand combat and the battle raged for two more hours but gradually the enemy broke contact and withdrew while being engaged by artillery strikes”.
It was now the turn of the Argentinians to attack. Major Carrizo-Salvadores manoeuvred Castañeda's reinforced platoon to close with 4 and 5 Platoons and meanwhile under the direction of an NCO, part of Castañeda's platoon converged on the British aid post. Colour Sergeant Brian Faulkner, seeing that more than 20 wounded Paras on the western slopes of the mountain were about to fall into the hands of one of the sections of Castañeda's platoon, deployed anyone fit enough to defend the British Regimental Aid Post. "I picked four blokes and got up on this high feature, and as I did so this troop [in fact a reinforced section of fifteen riflemen]of twenty, or thirty Argentinians were coming towards us. We just opened fire on them. We don't know how many we killed, but they got what they deserved, because none of them were left standing when we'd finished with them." said Faulkner.
Things were so bad that Major Mike Argue's company ceased firing and devoted their full efforts to withdrawing from Fly Half. Peter Harclerode, a noted British historian of the Parachute Regiment, went on record, saying that:
“Under covering fire, Nos. 4 and 5 Platoons withdrew, but another man was killed and others wounded in the process. At that point, Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike and his 'R' Group arrived on the scene and Major Argue briefed him on the situation. Shortly afterwards, Company Sergeant Major Weekes reported that both platoons had pulled back to a safe distance and that all the wounded had been recovered. The dead, however, had to be left where they had fallen. Meanwhile, on the southern slope of the objective, the wounded from No. 6 Platoon were being evacuated while the rest remained under cover of the rocks”.
The British 3rd Commando Brigade commander, Brigadier Julian Thompson was reported as having said:
"I was on the point of withdrawing my Paras from Mount Longdon. We couldn't believe that these teenagers disguised as soldiers were causing us to suffer many casualties."
By the time the 21 survivors of Castañeda's 46-man platoon had worked their way off the mountain, they were utterly exhausted. One of them, Private Leonardo Rondi, was sporting a maroon beret – taken from a dead parachute soldier. Private Rondi, having dodged groups of Paras to deliver messages to Castañeda's section leaders, had found a dead Para behind a rock (it may have been Sergeant McKay) and took his red beret and SLR which he later gave to the Argentine commanders as trophies. Rondi was awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal.
Following the unexpectedly fierce fighting on Fly Half, Major Argue pulled back Nos. 4, and 5 Platoons, and 29 Commando Regiment began pounding the mountain from Mount Kent, after which a left flanking attack was put in. Under heavy fire, the remnants of 4 and 5 Platoons under Lieutenant Mark Cox advanced upon their objective of Full Back, taking some casualties from Casteñeda's platoon as they did so. As he was clearing the Argentinian position, Private Grey was injured from a headshot but refused to be evacuated until Major Argue had consolidated his troops properly in their positions on Fly Half. Private Kevin Connery personally dispatched three wounded Argentinians in this action. The Paras could not move any further without taking unacceptable losses and so were pulled back to the western end of Mount Longdon, with the orders for Major David Collett's A Company to move through B Company and assault, from the west, the eastern objective of Full Back, a heavily defended position, with covering fire being given from Support Company.
Second Lieutenants John Kearton and Ian Moore mustered their platoons near the western summit and had briefed them on how to deal with the enemy. They soon attacked the position in bitter close-combat, clearing the position of the Argentinian defenders with rifle, grenade and bayonet. As A Company was clearing the final positions, Corporal McLaughlin was injured by a Czekalski recoiless rifle round fired from Wireless Ridge. Unfortunately the brave NCO was killed by a mortar bomb fired from RI 7's C Company on Wireless Ridge as he made his way to the aid post. The Argentinians rigorously defended Full Back. Although already wounded, Corporal Manuel Medina of Castañeda's platoon took over a recoilless rifle detachment and personally fired along the ridge at Support Company killing three Paras, including Private Peter Heddicker, who took the full force of the 105 mm round, and wounding three others. Major Carrizo-Salvadores abandoned his command bunker on Full Back only when a MILAN missile smashed into some rocks just behind him. In the command bunker Major Collett found 2,000 cigarettes which he gave to the smokers in his company.
The battle and the aftermath that followed lasted twelve-hours and had been costly to both sides. 3 PARA lost seventeen killed during the battle, one Royal Engineer attached to 3 PARA was also killed. Two of the 3 PARA dead – Privates Ian Scrivens and Jason Burt – were only seventeen years old, and Private Neil Grose was killed on his 18th birthday. A total of forty British paratroopers were wounded during the battle. A further four Paras and one REME were killed and seven Paratroopers were wounded in the two-day shelling that followed that was directed from Sub-Lieutenant Marcelo de Marco of the 5th Marines on Tumbledown Mountain. The Argentinians suffered 31 dead and 120 wounded, with fifty also being taken prisoner.
Lance-Corporal Vincent Bramley was patrolling the western half of Mount Longdon when he was confronted with the full horror of the night combat. The 3 PARA NCO and keen writer stumbled upon the bodies of five Paratroopers killed by the forward Argentine platoon.
“A few bullets whizzed overhead and smashed into the rocks. A corporal shouted that Tumbledown was firing at us. We ran into a tight gap in the path of all came to an abrupt halt, as it was a dead end. Four or five bodies lay sprawled there, close together. This time they were our own men: the camouflaged Para smocks hit my eyes immediately. CSM [Company-Sergeant-Major] Wicks was standing over them like a guardian, screaming at some of his men to cover the further end of the path and a small crest. The CSM and Sergeant P [Pettinger] exchanged quick words. I wasn't listening; my mind was totally occupied with looking into the crags for the enemy. I turned and looked at our own lads, dead on the ground, mowed down when they tried to rush through this gap. I felt both anger and sadness. The CSM's face showed the strain of having seen most of his company either wounded or shot dead. That night's fighting was written in every line of his face.”
The battle was particularly brutal with little quarter being shown by either side.
Battle of Mount Tumbledown
The Battle of Mount Tumbledown was an engagement of the Falklands War, one of a series of battles that took place during the British advance towards Stanley. The battle took place on the night of 13 June – 14 June 1982. In the battle, the British launched an assault on Tumbledown Mountain, one of the heights that dominate the town of Stanley, and succeeded in driving the Argentine forces from the mountain. This close-quarter night battle has gone down in British military history and was later immortalized in the BBC film Tumbledown.
The attacking British force consisted of the 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards with mortar detachments from 42 Commando, Royal Marines and the 1/7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles with support from a troop of the Blues and Royals equipped with two Scorpion and two Scimitar armoured vehicles. The attack was supported by naval gunfire from HMS Active's 4.5-inch gun. The Argentines defending the mountain were Commander Carlos Robacio's 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM 5). Prior to the British landings, the marine battalion had been augmented by a company of the Amphibious Engineers Company (CKIA), a battery of the 1st Marine Artillery Battalion (BIAC), three Tigercat SAM batteries of the 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Regiment as well as a heavy machine-gun company of the Headquarter's Battalion (BICO). The Argentinean defenders held firm under the heavy 'softening up' bombardment, which began at 7.30 local time. As Major Oscar Jaimet recalled in:
“I heard the cries of the wounded calling for their comrades, twelve men wounded before nightfall. We thought we had suffered before, but what luxury and comfort compared to this”.
During the battle the 5th Marines Command Post took five direct hits butCommander Robacio emerged unscathed.
Early movesOn the morning of 13 June the Scots Guards were moved by helicopter from their position at Bluff Cove to an assembly area near Goat Ridge, to the west of Mount Tumbledown. The British plan called for a diversionary attack to be made south of Mount Tumbledown by a small number of Scots Guards assisted by the four light tanks of the Blues and Royals, whilst the main attack came as a three-phase silent advance from the west of Mount Tumbledown. In the first phase, G company would take the western end of the mountain; in the second phase Left Flank Company would pass through the area taken by G company to capture the centre of the summit; and in the third phase Right Flank Company would pass through Left Flank Company to secure the eastern end of Tumbledown. A daytime assault was initially planned, but was postponed at the British battalion commander's request. Having held a planning meeting with his company commanders, the consensus was that the long uphill assault across the harsh ground of Tumbledown would have been suicidal.
Diversion
At 8.30 p.m. on 13 June the diversionary attack began. The 2nd Scots Guards' Reconnaissance Platoon, commanded by Major Richard Bethell (a former SAS officer) and supported by four light tanks of the Blues & Royals, attacked the Argentinian Marine company entrenched on the lower slopes of Mount William. On reaching Mount William's southern slopes one of the tanks was blasted out of action by a booby-trap. The initial advance was unopposed, but a heavy fire-fight broke out when the two forces made contact and continued for two hours. Two Guardsmen were killed and four wounded before the forward Argentine platoon position fell silent.
Realizing that they could be counter-attacked at any time, the British platoon withdrew from the Marine position and inadvertently entered a minefield. Two men were wounded covering the withdrawal and a further four were wounded by mines. The explosions prompted the Marine commanders to order the 81 mm Mortar Platoon on Mount William and Argentine artillery to open fire on the minefield and the likely withdrawal route of anyone attacking Mount William. The barrage lasted for about forty minutes and more British casualties would have been suffered if the ground the mortar bombs landed on had not been soft peat, which absorbed most of the blast.
Night attack
At 9 p.m., half an hour after the start of the diversionary attack, Major Iain Dalzel-Job's G Company started its advance of nearly two miles. Reaching its objective undetected, the company found the western end of the mountain undefended and occupied it easily. Major John Kiszely's Left Flank Company passed through them and reached the central region of the peak unopposed, but then came under heavy fire. Major Kiszely, the company commander and his men threw themeselves to the ground to try to get under cover from the storm of FAL rounds that had erupted around them. The Argentines, later learned to be of company strength, directed mortar, grenade, machine-gun and small arms fire from very close range at the British company, which suffered two dead, Guardsman Ronald Tanbini and Sergeant John Simeon. First Lieutenant Héctor Mino's 5th Platoon, Amphibious Engineer Company, held the rocks to the right of First Lieutenant Carlos Vázquez's 4th Platoon, 5th Marines in the centre and to the left of the 4th Platoon were Second Lieutenant Óscar Silva's RI 4 platoon, who had recently fought well on Goat Ridge. For four or five hours three platoons of Argentine riflemen, machine-gunners and mortarmen pinned the British down. To help identify the bunkers, the Guardsmen fired flares into the summit. The Guardsmen traded 66 mm rockets and 84 mm rounds with the Argentines protected in their rock bunkers. The enemy refused to budge and the Scots Guards could hear some of the Argentines shouting obscene phrases in English and even singing as they fought. Meanwhile, two Royal Navy frigates, HMS Yarmouth and HMS Active, were pounding Tumbledown with 4.5 inch guns. At one stage Colonel Scott thought the 2nd Scots Guards Battalion might have to withdraw and attack again the next night.
“The old nails were being bitten a bit, if we had been held on Tumbledown it might have encouraged them to keep on fighting.”
The fighting was hard going for the Left Flank Company. The Argentineans had well dug in machineguns and sniper fire caused all manner of problems. At 2.30 a.m., however, a second British assault overwhelmed the Argentine defences, as British troops swarmed the defences at the mountaintop and drove the Argentines out, at times fighting with fixed bayonets at close quarters. Major Kiszely, who was to become a senior general after the war, was the first man into the enemy position, personally shooting two enemy conscripts and bayoneting a third, his bayonet breaking in two while the hapless Argentine expired. Seeing their company commander among the Argentines inspired 14 and 15 Platoons to make the final dash across open ground to get within bayoneting distance of the Marines. Kiszely and six other Guardsmen suddenly found themeselves standing on top of the mountain, looking down on Port Stanley under street lighting and with vehicles moving along the roads. The Argentines now counter-attacked and a burst of machine-gun fire from 1 Platoon of Second Lieutenant Augusto La Madrid immediately injured three of these men, including the company commander and Lieutenant Alastair Mitchell, commander of 15 Platoon. For his bayonet charge Major Kiszely was awarded the Military Cross.
Morning
By 6 a.m. Left Flank Company's attack had clearly stalled and had cost the company seven men killed and 18 wounded. On the eastern half of the mountain the 6th Regiment's B Company (under command of Major Oscar Jaimet) were still holding out, so Colonel Scott ordered Right Flank Company to push on to clear the final positions. Major Simon Price sent 2 and 3 Platoons forward, preceded by a barrage of 66 mm rockets to clear the forward RI 6 platoon. Major Price placed 1 Platoon high up in the rocks to provide fire support for the assault troops. Lieutenant Robert Lawrence led 3 Platoon round to the right of the Argentine platoon, hoping to take the Argentines by surprise. The advance was noticed, however, and the British were briefly pinned down by gunfire before a bayonet charge overwhelmed the Argentine defenders. Lance-Corporal Graham Rennie of 3 Platoon in the book 5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands (Pen & Sword Books, 2003) later described the attack:
“Our assault was initiated by a Guardsman killing a sniper, which was followed by a volley of 66 mm anti-tanks rounds. We ran forward in extended line, machine-gunnners and riflemen firing from the hip to keep the enemy heads down, enabling us to cover the open ground in the shortest possible time. Halfway across the open ground 2 Platoon went to ground to give covering fire support, enabling us to gain a foothold on the enemy position. From then on we fought from crag to crag, rock to rock, taking out pockets of enemy and lone riflemen, all of who resisted fiercely”.
As La Madrid had to withdraw in the face of a superior assaulting force, the platoons under Second Lieutenant Aldo Franco and Guillermo Robredo moved in from the eastern edge of the mountain to try to extricate La Madrid and the Marine platoon (under Second Lieutenant Marcelo Oruezabala) holding the saddle between Mounts Tumbledown and William. Advancing out of the saddle of the mountain, the British again came under heavy fire from the Argentines, but advancing in pairs under covering fire, the British succeeded in clearing that RI 6 platoons as well, gaining firm control of the mountain's eastern side. Right Flank Company had achieved this at the cost of five wounded, including Lieutenant Robert Lawrence. In his moment of victory on the eastern slopes, Lt Lawrence's life nearly ended when a bullet fired by a stay-behind enemy sniper tore off the side of his head. He was awarded the Military Cross for bravery, but he spent a year in a wheelchair and was almost totally paralysed. The Argentinean soldier in question with a FAL rifle had helped cover the Argentinean retreat, firing shots at a Scout helicopter evacuating wounded off Tumbledown and injured two Guardsmen before the Scots Guards mortally wounded him in a hail of gunfire.
AftermathBy 9 a.m. the Scots Guards were in control of Tumbledown. The battalion had lost nine dead and forty-three wounded, and one of the Guardsmen was to lose his way in the dark, to hide for more than a month, not realising that the fighting was over. The Guards took thirty prisoners, several of them RI 6 soldiers. To Guardsman Tracy Evens the Sapper Hill positions looked impregnable:
'We were led to an area that the company would rest at for the night, I still took in the fact the Argies had prepared Sapper Hill well, they had depth positions that would have made the task of taking it very hard”.
The bodies of 30 Argentine Army and Marine soldiers were strewn over the 5th Marine Battalion perimeter, one of the dead being an RI 6 soldier who had been bayoneted to death by a Guardsman while he attended to a wounded comrade. Unwilling to abandon the hill, Commander Carlos Robacio on Sapper Hill decided the time was ripe to counterattack and drive back the Guardsmen. Only the personal intervention of Colonel Félix Aguiar, the 10th Brigade Chief of Staff, brought the fighting to an end. The 5th Marines worked their way back into Port Stanley, where within a few hours the Argentine garrison would surrender. The bayonet charges of the Scots Guards had broken the back of the 5th Marines defence line.
During the battle, a soldier called Philip Williams was knocked unconscious by an explosion, and left for dead. When he came to, the rest of the British soldiers had gone. Williams' parents were informed of his "death" and a memorial service held for him. It took him seven weeks to find his way back to civilization, braving atrocious weather. He was then victimised by the media and fellow soldiers, amid accusations of desertion.
For the courage displayed in the attack, men from the 2nd Scots Guards were awarded one Distinguished Service Order, two Military Crosses, two Distinguished Conduct Medals (one posthumously) and two Military Medals. Men from 9 Para Squadron, Royal Engineers, were awarded two Military Medals and a member of the Army Air Corps received the Distinguished Flying Cross.
Battle of Wireless Ridge
The Battle of Wireless Ridge was an engagement of the Falklands War which took place on the night of 13 June and 14 June 1982, between British and Argentinian forces during the advance towards the Argentine-occupied capital of the Falklands Stanley. Wireless Ridge was one of seven strategic hills within five miles of Stanley that had to be taken in order for the city to be approached. The attack was successful, and the entire Argentine force on the Islands surrendered later that day.
The British force consisted of 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, a troop of the Blues & Royals, with two FV101 Scorpion and two FV107 Scimitar light tanks, as well as artillery support from two batteries of 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery and naval gunfire support provided by HMS Ambuscade's 4.5-in gun. The Argentine force consisted of the 7th Infantry Regiment and detachments from other units.
BackgroundAfter heavy losses during the Battle of Goose Green, including their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jones, command of 2 Para passed to Lieutenant-Colonel David Chaundler, who was in England at the time of the battle. In an adventure of its own, Chaundler flew to Ascension Island on a Vickers VC-10 and then to the Falklands on a C-130 Hercules that was dropping supplies by parachute. Chaundler jumped out into the sea, where he was picked up by helicopter and eventually delivered to the HMS Hermes for a brief talk with Admiral Woodward and then to Major General Jeremy Moore's headquarters. Four days after Goose Green, Chaundler joined 2nd Para. After debriefing the officers of 2 Para about Goose Green and the events following, he vowed that 2 Para would never again go into action without fire support.
From Fitzroy, 2 Para were moved by helicopter to Bluff Cove Peak where they were held in reserve. The first line of hills, the Two Sisters, Mount Longdon and Mount Harriet, were taken. Following this phase the next three hills would be taken; the Scots Guards taking Mount Tumbledown, the Ghurkhas Mount William and 2 Para Wireless Ridge. The final phase of 3 Commando Brigade's campaign, the battle for Stanley, would have been a street-fight but in the end wasn't necessary. On the morning of 13 June it became clear that the attacks on Tumbledown had been successful. 2 Para would now march around the back of Mount Longdon to take up their positions for the assault on Wireless Ridge. As the action was to be concluded quickly, they took only their weapons and as much ammunition as possible, leaving the camp behind. On Bluff Cove Peak, the Battalion's mortars and heavy machine guns were attacked by Argentine A-4 Skyhawks who delayed their planned move forward, although causing no casualties.
Initial assault
In the closing hours of the 13 June, D Company began the attack, advancing upon 'Rough Diamond' hill north-west of Mount Longdon. It had been hit by an immense barrage from British guns, from land and sea. In the preceding 12 hours, British artillery had fired 6,000 rounds with their 105 mm pieces, and as they began their push, they were further backed by naval fire and the 76 and 30 mm guns mounted on the light tanks. The approximately eighty casualties sustained by the Paras a few weeks earlier at the Battle of Goose Green (including the loss of their commanding officer), had induced them not to take any unnecessary chances the second time around.
When D Company reached the hill, they found that the Argentinian C Company of the 7th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn due to the heavy bombardment. As Major Philip Neame's D Company started to consolidate their position, the Argentinian 7th Regiment launched a series of heavy recoilless rifle, rocket and mortar attacks on Mount Longon causing casualties and destruction to the 3rd Parachute Battalion the Parachute Regiment (Jolly, 1983; p. 138).
With this massive fire support A and B Companies were convinced the enemy on Apple Pie were defeated, and began to advance confidently forward but they met fierce resistance for when they left their trenches they came under heavy machine-gun fire and a massive retaliation was initiated by the British machine-gunners and the guns of the Blues & Royals light tanks.
One Mount Longdon survivor from 3 PARA recalled the British attack in Hugh McManners' The Scars of War (1994) which was initially repulsed the Argentineans:
"They tried going over the top first, but the incoming fire was too heavy so they went back behind the peat and waited for more artillery to soften them up." (McManners, 1994)
The Argentinian defenders there eventually withdrew in the face of such withering fire and A and B Companies took their objective. By this stage of the battle there were not many Argentine officers left. The Forward Artillery Observation Officer (Major Guillermo Nani), the Operations Officer (Captain Carlos Ferreyra) and the A and C Company commanders (Captains Jorge Calvo and Hugo García) and at least three senior platoon commanders (First Lieutenants Antonio Estrada, Jorge Guidobono, Ramon Galíndez-Matienzo) were wounded. C Company then moved down from their northern start line to advance to a position east of Wireless Ridge where they found a platoon position to be unoccupied.
Final assault
D Company then began the final assault from the western end of Wireless Ridge, under the cover of heavy fire from HMS Ambuscade, tanks, twelve 105 mm artillery guns, several mortar pieces and anti-tank rockets. Earlier Argentinean GHQ had sent the dismounted 10th Panhard armoured car squadron to make a reconnaissance foray into the western rocks of Wireless Ridge. Captain Rodrigo Soloaga was particularly effective in persuading his men to engage the light tanks, Milan Platoon and the Machinegun Platoon on Apple Pie while the 7th Regiment's HQ sorted themeselves out. In two hours the cavalry unit suffered five killed and about fifty wounded. The British tankmen were so sickened by the slaughter that they held their fire as the walking wounded stumbled back to Moody Brook and stretcher-bearers tried to find the seriously wounded. Major Neame's parachute company took the first half of the obective relatively easily but upon advancing to the second half, came under very fierce attack from Major Guillermo Berazay A Company of the 3rd Regiment which had tried to move forward to Mount Longdon during the fighting two nights earlier but had only reached Moody Brook valley. Private Patricio Pérez, who had just left school, recalled the unnerving experience of 66 mm rockets coming straight at them like undulating fireballs (Bilton and Kosminsky, 1989). He believed he shot a British Paratrooper (12 Platoon's commander?) and became enraged when he heard that his friend Private Horacio Benítez of his platoon had been shot ("Speaking Out" Bilton and Kosminsky pg. 192). The platoon of 2nd Lieutenant Víctor Rodriguez Pérez of Major Guillermo Berazay's company in fact closed with the British 12 Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Jonathan Page (following the death of Lieutenant Barry at Goose Green). The fight surged back and forth. Lieutenant Page managed to hold the line, but only just. Major-General John Dutton Frost of the British Army describes the resulting attack on 12 Platoon:
"For two very long hours the company remained under pressure. Small-arms fire mingled with all types of HE [high explosive rifle-grenades] fell in and around 12 Platoon's position as the men crouched in the abandoned enemy sangars and in shell holes." (Frost, 1983)
But Major Neame officers and NCOs rallied the men to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of immense fire, the Argentinians having ran out of ammunition broke and retreated.
The battle was not all over yet. Some 200 Wireless Ridge survivors had been rallied by the 10th Brigade Operations Officer, Major Eugenio Dalton to form under heavy gunfire a last-ditch defensive line in front of the now silenced guns of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group on the racecourse.
Near the church in Stanley, intent on helping Berazay, Major Carrizo-Salvadores, 2IC of the 7th Regiment, helped by the chaplain Father José Fernández, mustered about 50 Wireless Ridge survivors and led them on a bayonet charge, with the soldiers chanting their famous 'Malvinas March' but were stopped by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. ("Razor's Edge" Hugh Bicheno pg. 312)
The Paras were momentarily alarmed and watched the amazing sight, with one British officer describing it as 'quite a sporting effort, but one without a sporting chance'. ("Operation Corporate" Martin Middlebrook pg. 371)
2 Para had suffered three dead and eleven wounded. The Argentinians suffered approximately twenty-five dead, about 125 wounded (mainly by explosive rounds rather than direct shots) and about fifty were taken prisoner.
For the bravery shown at Wireless Ridge, 2 Para was awarded three Military Crosses, one Military Medal and one Distinguished Conduct Medal. 29 Commando was awarded one Military Cross.
The fall of Stanley
On the night of June 11, after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously assaulted in the Battle of Mount Harriet, Battle of Two Sisters, and Battle of Mount Longdon.
During this battle, 13 were killed when HMS Glamorgan, straying too close to shore while returning from the gun line, was struck by an improvised trailer-based Exocet MM38 launcher taken from ARA Seguí destroyer by Argentine Navy techinicians. On this day, Sgt Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on an Argentine bunker which was to earn him a posthumous Victoria Cross. After a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured.
The night of June 13 saw the start of the second phase of attacks, in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para captured Wireless Ridge at the Battle of Wireless Ridge, and the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown.
With the last natural defence line at Mount Tumbledown breached, the Argentine town defences of Stanley began to falter. In the morning gloom, one company commander got lost and his junior officers became despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the houses and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him", but the entire company did nothing of the kind.
On June 14, the commander of the Argentine garrison in Stanley, Brigade General Mario Menéndez, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore. 9,800 Argentine troops were made prisoners of war and some 4,167 were repatriated to Argentina on the ocean liner Canberra alone.
On June 20, the British retook the South Sandwich Islands, (which involved accepting the surrender of the Southern Thule Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay base) and declared hostilities to be over. Corbeta Uruguay was established in 1976, but the Argentine base was ignored by the UK until 1982.
The war lasted 74 days, with 255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and three civilian Falklanders killed.
The British Government decreed that all classified information would be available to the public in the year 2082.
CasualtiesIn total 907 were killed during the 74 days of the conflict:
Argentina - 649
Ejército Argentino ( Army ) - 194 (16 officers, 35 NCOs and 143 conscript privates)
Armada de la República Argentina ( Navy ) - 341 (including 321 in Belgrano and 4 naval aviators)
IMARA ( Marines ) - 34
Fuerza Aérea Argentina ( Air Force ) - 55 (including 31 pilots and 14 ground crew)
Gendarmería Nacional Argentina ( Border Guard ) - 7
Prefectura Naval Argentina ( Coast Guard ) - 2
Civilian sailors - 16
United Kingdom - 258
Royal Navy - 86 + 2 Hong Kong Chinese laundrymen (see below)
Royal Marines - 27 (2 officers, 14 NCOs & 11 privates)
Royal Fleet Auxiliary - 4 + 4 Hong Kong Chinese laundrymen
Merchant Navy - 6 + 2 Hong Kong Chinese sailors
British Army - 123 (7 officers, 40 NCOs & 76 privates)
Royal Air Force - 1
Falklands Islands civilians - 3 (3 women killed by friendly fire)
Of the 86 Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost in HMS Ardent, 19 + 1 lost in HMS Sheffield, 18 + 1 lost in HMS Coventry and 13 lost in HMS Glamorgan. 14 naval cooks were among the dead, the largest number from any one branch in the Royal Navy.
33 of the British Army's dead came from the Welsh Guards, 21 from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 18 from the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 19 from the Special Air Service (SAS), 3 from Royal Signals and 8 from each of the Scots Guards and Royal Engineers.
As well as memorials on the islands, there is a memorial to the British war dead in the crypt of St Paul's Cathedral, London. As for the Argentine war dead, there is a memorial at Plaza San Martín in Buenos Aires, another one in Rosario and a third one in Ushuaia.
There were also 1,188 Argentine and 777 British casualties in addition to the war dead; some of these service personnel were later to die of their injuries. Further information about the field hospitals and hospital ships is at Ajax Bay, List of hospitals and hospital ships of the Royal Navy, HMS Hydra and Argentine Navy's ARA Almirante Irizar.
There are still 125 uncleared minefields on the Falkland Islands and according to forcesmemorial.org.uk via Falklands25's "Official Commemorative Publication" 30 British servicemen had died on the islands, since the end of the hostilities.
PoliticalThe Argentine loss of the war led to ever-larger protests against the military regime and is credited with giving the final push to drive out the military government that had overthrown Isabel Perón in 1976 and participated in the crimes of the Dirty War. Galtieri was forced to resign and elections were held on 30 October 1983 and Raúl Alfonsín, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) party candidate, took office on 10 December 1983. Alfonsín defeated Italo Luder, the candidate for the Justicialist Party (Peronist movement).
For the UK, the war cost 255 men, six ships (ten others suffered varying degrees of battle damage), 34 aircraft and £2.778 billion, but the campaign was considered a great victory for the United Kingdom. The war provided a substantial boost to the popularity of Margaret Thatcher and undoubtedly played a role in ensuring her re-election in 1983. Several members of her government resigned, however, including the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, the last time that a UK government minister resigned openly in response to a failure of his department (in not anticipating the war).
Criticism was levelled at Ted Rowlands, a former junior foreign minister in the preceding government, who disclosed in Parliament in April 1982 that the British had broken the Argentine diplomatic codes. Because the same code machines were used by the Argentine military, this disclosure immediately served to deny British access to valuable intelligence. This, and other responses to parliamentary questions, and leaks of information to the BBC has been alleged by historian Hugh Bicheno to be a deliberate attempt to undermine the Thatcher government on the part of a variety of individuals who had a vested interest in its fall.
The United States international image was damaged because of the perception in Latin America that it broke the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) by providing UK with all kinds of military supplies. Chile is also perceived to have broken the TIAR because they supported UK troops. In September 2001, President of Mexico Vicente Fox cited the Falklands War as proof of the failure of the TIAR.
Ultimately, the successful conclusion of the war gave a noticeable fillip to British patriotic feeling, with the mobilisation of national identity encapsulated in the concept of "Falklands Factor." Since the failure of the 1956 Suez campaign, the end of Empire and the economic decline of the 1970s which culminated in the Winter of Discontent, Britain had been beset by uncertainty and anxiety about its international role, status and capability. With the war successfully concluded, Thatcher was returned to power with an increased Parliamentary majority and felt empowered to press ahead with the painful economic readjustments of Thatcherism. A second major effect was a reaffirmation of the special relationship between the US and UK to arguably its closest level ever. Both Reagan and Weinberger (his Secretary of Defence) received honorary knighthoods for their help in the campaign, but the more obvious result was the common alignment of Britain and the USA in a more confrontational foreign policy against the Soviet bloc, sometimes known as the Second Cold War.
Mobilisation of national identity in Argentina, called the "Malvinas Spirit," has now developed in a constant recovery of the relevant aspects of the Falklands-Malvinas War that boost national self-image.
Military
Militarily, the Falklands conflict remains the major air-naval combat operation between modern forces since the end of the Second World War. In his Price of Admiralty, military historian Sir John Keegan noted that the brief conflict showed the irremediable vulnerability of surface ships to anti-ship missiles, and, most importantly, to submarines. Thus, despite the seemingly limited consequences of the war, it, in fact, confirmed the dominance of the submarine in naval warfare. This is especially so, Keegan argues, because submarines are far less vulnerable than aircraft to counterattack, being able to approach and destroy their targets with almost complete impunity. However, Keegan's conclusions must remain conjectural since no other naval conflict of consequence has occurred since 1982.
Neither side achieved total air supremacy; nonetheless, air power proved to be of critical importance during the conflict, due to the isolated, rough landscape of the Falklands in which the mobility of land forces was restricted. Air strikes were staged against ground, sea and air targets on both sides, and often with clear results. All of the UK losses at sea were caused by aircraft or missile strikes (by both the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation). The French Exocet missile proved its lethality in air-to-surface operations, leading to retrofitting of most major ships with Close-in weapon systems (CIWS).
The air war in the Falklands vindicated the UK decision to maintain at least the STOVL aircraft carriers after the retirement of the HMS Ark Royal. The domination of air power in major naval engagements was demonstrated, along with the usefulness of carriers and it proved the small but manoeuvrable Sea Harrier as a true fighter. Sea Harriers shot down 21 aircraft with no air-to-air losses themselves, although six Sea Harriers were lost to ground fire and accidents.
It should be noted that the disparity in figures, with the Argentine fighters failing to shoot down a single Sea Harrier, can be explained by several factors. The Argentine planes were operating at the limit of their range (average 450 milles) with no fuel available for dogfighting; the air combat training of the British pilots was indisputably superior; limited fighter control was provided by British warships in San Carlos Water, the then almost unparalleled Blue Fox radar, and the extreme manoeuvrability of the Sea Harrier. These factors were also enhanced with the use by the British of the latest AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles while the Argentine strike planes had no air-to-air missiles for self defence; 2 of their 21 confirmed kills were made against unarmed planes. The only theoretical advantage of the Argentine jets would be their greater speed. However, Argentine pilots could not benefit from this unless they risked running out of fuel, as was seen in the first air combat of the war when a Mirage IIIEA was forced to attempt a landing at Stanley.
The logistic capability of the UK armed forces was stretched to the absolute limit in order to mount an amphibious operation so far from a home-base, onto mountainous islands with few roads. After the war, much work was done to improve both the logistic and amphibious capability of the Royal Navy. Task force commander Rear Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward refers to the conflict as "a lot closer run than many would care to believe", reflecting the naval and military belief that few people understood — or understand — the extent to which the logistical dimension made the war a difficult operation for the UK. The ships of the task force could only remain on station for a limited time in the worsening southern hemisphere winter. With such a high proportion of the Royal Navy's surface fleet actively engaged, or lost in combat, there were few units available for northbound traffic. At the core of the fleet, Invincible could possibly have been replaced by the hastily-prepared Illustrious, but there was no replacement available for Hermes, the larger of the two British carriers. Woodward's strategy, therefore, required the land war to be won before Hermes, in particular, succumbed to the harsh environment. This, as Woodward said, was "a damned close run thing".
The usefulness of Special Forces units was reaffirmed. British special forces destroyed many Argentine aircraft (notably in the SAS raid on Pebble Island) and carried out highly informative intelligence gathering operations.
Contrary to popular understanding, the Argentine Special Forces also patrolled hard, in appalling climatic conditions, against a professional enemy and showed that they could sometimes get the upperhand.
The usefulness of helicopters in combat, logistic, and casevac operations was confirmed.
Nylon was shown to be a poor choice for fabric in uniforms, as it is more flammable than cotton and also melts with heat. Burning nylon adheres to the skin, causing avoidable casualties.
The importance of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) was shown. The Royal Navy had effectively no over-the-horizon radar capability. This was to be hastily rectified after the war as Sea King helicopters were fitted with retractable radomes containing a variant of the Nimrod ASW aircraft's Searchwater radar. These first travelled south after the war on the brand new HMS Illustrious, sister ship to Invincible.
Weapon export controls
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) failed to anticipate a conflict between Argentina and the UK when approving weapon exports to Argentina.
Medical
During the operations, several wounded British soldiers had to spend hours in the cold before receiving medical aid - yet no British soldier died who was evacuated to a medical aid station, a fact confirmed by Dr Rick Jolly, the Chief Medical Officer. Many recovered better than medical opinion of the time considered possible, and subsequent theories have suggested that this was due to the extreme cold. Britain also had medical staff familiar with high velocity gunshot wounds, due to their experiences in the Northern Ireland conflict with the IRA.
The trials of one British patient, Robert Lawrence, MC, were chronicled in a book co-authored by him entitled When the Fighting is Over which was later adapted into a television film. Lawrence was shot at close range by an FN rifle and lost a large percentage of brain matter, but recovered to a degree not thought possible. After the war he became an outspoken critic of the British Army's treatment of Falklands veterans. He remains partially paralysed in the left side of his body.
Public Relations
Argentina:Pre-war: La Prensa speculated in a step-by-step plan beginning with cutting off supplies to the Islands, ending in direct actions late 1982, if the the UN talks were fruitless.War: Selected war correspondents were regularly flown to Port Stanley in military aircraft to report on the war. Back in Buenos Aires newspapers and magazines faithfully reported on the heroic actions of the largely conscript army and its successes.Officers from the intelligence services were attached to the newspapers and 'leaked' information, which verified the official communiqués from the government. The glossy magazines Gente and Siete Días swell to sixty pages with colour photographs and eyewitness reports of the Argentine commandos' guerrilla war on South Georgia 6th May and an already dead Pucará pilot's attack on HMS Hermes .The Malvinas course united the Argentines in a patriotic atmosphere, preserving the junta of critics - even the Madres de Plaza de Mayo were exposed to death threats from ordinary people.
United Kingdom: 17 newspaper reporters, 2 photographers, 2 radio reporters and 3 television reporters with 5 technicians sailed with the Task Force to the war. The Newspaper Publishers' Association selected them from among 160 applicants, excluding foreign media. Due to the hasty departure, all of them weren't "the right stuff": two journalists on HMS Invincible were interested in nothing but Queen Elizabeth's son Prince Andrew.
Merchant vessels had the civilian INMARSAT uplink, which enabled written telex as well as voice report transmissions via satellite. On Canberra there was a facsimile machine which was used to upload 202 pictures from the South Atlantic over the course of the war. The Royal Navy leased bandwidth on US 'Defence Satellite Communications System' satellites for worldwide communications. Television demands a bandwidth 1,000 times greater than telephone, but the MoD was unsuccessful in convincing the US to allocate more bandwidth. Perhaps the enquiry was half-hearted; since the Vietnam War television pictures of casualties and traumatised soldiers were recognised as having negative propaganda value. Videotapes were shipped to Ascension Island, where a broadband satellite uplink was available, resulting in TV coverage being delayed by three weeks.
The press was very dependent on the Royal Navy, and was censored on site. Many reporters in the UK knew more about the war than those with the Task Force. The Royal Navy expected Fleet Street to conduct a World War Two style positive news campaign (like:"our lads beat the Argies") and many reporters, especially from the BBC, wanted to cover the war in a neutral fashion.
Pope John Paul II visits
In May 1982, Pope John Paul II carried out a long-scheduled visit to the United Kingdom. In view of the crisis it was decided that this should be balanced with an unscheduled trip to Argentina in June. It is contended that his presence and words spiritually prepared Argentines for a possible defeat, contrary to the propaganda issued by the Junta. He would return to Argentina in 1987 after democratisation.
Allegations of nuclear deployment
It has been asserted, although not corroborated, that the French President François Mitterrand claimed that Margaret Thatcher threatened to carry out a nuclear strike against Córdoba unless the UK Government were provided with destruction codes for the Exocet missile. It has been reported that two years after the war, Labour MPs demanded an inquiry into reports that a Resolution class submarine armed with the Polaris SLBMs had deployed to Ascension Island during the operation, ostensibly to prepare for a nuclear strike. The Ministry of Defence is reported to have denied the allegations, and Freedman's Official History does the same.
In 1982, British warships were routinely armed with the WE.177, a tactical nuclear weapon with a variable yield of either 10 kilotons or 0.5 kT, which could be used to attack land targets, or as a Nuclear Depth Bomb in an antisubmarine role. The Official History describes the contorted logistical arrangements that led to the removal of the nuclear depth bombs from the frigates, following political alarm in Whitehall. Eventually at least some of the depth bombs were brought back to the UK by an RFA vessel. In December 2003, Argentine President Néstor Kirchner demanded an apology from the British Government for this "regrettable and monstrous" act.
MI6 activityIn his 2002 memoirs Sir John Nott made the following disclosure:
“I authorised our agents to pose as bona fide purchasers of equipment on the international market, ensuring that we outbid the Argentines, and other agents identified Exocet missiles in markets and rendered them inoperable.”
Cultural impact
There were wide-ranging influences on popular culture in both the UK and Argentina, from the immediate postwar period to the present. The words yomp and Exocet entered the British vernacular as a result of the war. The Falklands War also provided material for theatre, film and TV drama and influenced the output of musicians including (among others) English Post-Punk Band Gang of Four, Joe Jackson, Crass, New Model Army, Steve Dahl, Latin Quarter, and Elvis Costello, whose song "Shipbuilding", sung by Robert Wyatt, reached the British top 40.
Pink Floyd's 1983 album, The Final Cut, deals with Roger Waters' feelings regarding the Falklands War, among other war-related topics.
The Super Furry Animals, song "Piccolo Snare" contains several mentions of the conflict, referring to Skyhawks and Tumbledown.
In 2007 the British government expressed regrets over the deaths on both sides in the war. Margaret Thatcher was quoted as saying "in the struggle against evil... we can all today draw hope and strength" from the Falklands victory, while current Argentinian President Nestor Kirchner claimed that the UK won a colonial victory and vowed that the islands would one day return to Argentine sovereignty. He augmented this however, with an affirmation that the use of force could never again be used in an attempt to bring this about.
